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Recently, a remarkable shift in environmental attitudes has begun to gain 
traction. For example, just fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court agreed in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council that coastal property was valueless in its natural condition, 
and that the state could not prohibit its development without providing compensation to 
the affected landowner. Today, the highest court in at least one state has come to the 
opposite conclusion, determining that the development of coastal marshlands would 
constitute a public nuisance under state common law. An even more striking shift is 
underway in the area of climate change. In early 2005, one U.S. Senatorechoing the 
sentiments of manydenounced the threat of catastrophic global warming as the 
greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people. The following year, An 
Inconvenient Truth was released, moving Al Gore from the status of unsuccessful 
presidential candidate to accidental folk hero (in some quarters) and nominee for the 
2007 Nobel Peace Prize. At the same time, a sizeable group of prominent business 
leaders began a campaign to encourage Congress to regulate their own industries by 
enacting mandatory caps on greenhouse gas emissions. What factors could account for 
this remarkable shift? The attached article suggests two responses to that question. First, 
as the Lucas Court set forth a new categorical rule of governmental liability for 
regulatory takings, it also established a new defense that draws upon the states common 
law of nuisance and property. That defense has taken on a life of its own forming what 
this article calls the new nuisance doctrineevolving from defense, to offense, to 
catalyst for legislative change. Second, in 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck New 
Orleans and the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. The hurricanes and their 
resultant storm surge swept away levees, life, and property. They also shattered our 
skepticism that wetlands indeed perform valuable flood control functions, and challenged 
our belief that society can continue to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere without adverse impact upon the climate, weather patterns, and sea 
levels. As expressly contemplated by Lucas, changed circumstances and new learning 
should guide courts as they determine the appropriate contours, respectively, of property 
rights and the public interest. This article undertakes a survey of such new learning in the 
areas of wetland destruction, sprawling land patterns, and global warming.  It concludes 
by considering the extent to which this new information has been incorporated into the 
law of new nuisance. 
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INTRODUCTION: FROM NEW PROPERTY TO NEW NUISANCE 
 
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided the foundational 
modern case on regulatory takings, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1 In 
holding that a state law forbidding construction in certain coastal zones required 
compensation, the Court created a new total takings categorical rule, requiring 
governments to compensate landowners whenever regulation deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use.2 Just three years earlier, Hurricane Hugo had struck 
the very island in disputethe Isle of Palmsleading to thirty-five fatalities and 
six billion dollars in damage.3 Drawing upon this experience, South Carolina 
presented evidence that undeveloped lands provide valuable protection against 
coastal storms and hurricanes, and that for roughly half of the last 40 years, all or 
part of [the Lucas] property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily.4 
Rejecting such evidence, the Court accepted the premise that oceanfront lands are 
valueless in their natural state.5 In so doing, the majority gave little weight to 
the state legislatures finding that coastal development must be regulated to 
prevent harm to the community. The Court reasoned, [because] such a 
justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of 
whether the legislature has a stupid staff.6 
 
The Court tempered its new categorical rule with a new defense, planting 
the seed for the new nuisance doctrine that is the focus of this article. Under the 
Lucas defense, regulations that deprive property of all economically beneficial 
use cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must 
inhere in . . . the restrictions that background principles of the States law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.7 In concurrence, 
Justice Kennedy provided an important reminder that nuisance law is 
fundamentally evolutionary, such that changed circumstances or new knowledge 
may make what was previously permissible no longer so.8 As a result, the State 
should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to 
changing conditions.9 
                                                
1 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
2 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27. 
3 See infra Part II.C. 
4 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
5 505 U.S. at.1003. 
6 Id. at 1025 n.12. 
7 Id. at 1029. 
8 Id. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
9 Id. at 1035. 
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This article unpacks what I call the new nuisance doctrine, applying it to 
the environmental challenges posed by wetland destruction, sprawling 
development patterns, and global warming. Overall, Lucas triggered an 
unanticipated revitalization of the link between property and torts. By explicitly 
measuring the contours of property rights against the evolving backdrop of 
nuisanceprimarily a tort doctrinethe Court restored an important degree of 
flexibility to property rights. Moreover, the Lucas defense weakened the insularity 
of property rights, instead balancing the rights of the individual against the 
interests of the community. This article suggests that Lucas initiated a revolution 
in the way we think about property. Such a change has not been seen, perhaps, 
since 1964 when Charles Reich published The New Propertyan article that has 
been cited more than a thousand times by scholars and jurists.10  
 
My thesis is that the new nuisance doctrine of Lucas has moved from 
defense, to offense, to legislative catalyst. As others have noted, Lucas left a 
legacy surprisingly favorable to governmental defendants in the form of a new 
categorical defense.11 I add to this discovery by tracing the spillover effect of 
Lucas beyond the bounds of regulatory takings defense, into the realm of 
affirmative claims for common law nuisance. That is, as new ecological and other 
learning stimulated by Lucas begins to connect the dots between cause and effect, 
more aggressive nuisance claims will become viable. Even more far-reachingas 
nuisance liability has become more feasible in growing areas of study such as 
global warmingindustry leaders themselves have begun to call for uniform, 
federal legislation that may limit the uses to which their property can be 
employed.12 These are unexpected, pro-regulatory developments, stimulated at 
least in part by the purportedly anti-regulatory Lucas decision.  
 
Part I examines the modern property rights movement, with its emphasis 
upon individual rights relatively unfettered by public interest regulation. Parts II 
and III place the Lucas decision into historical context, delineating periods of 
roughly thirty to fifty years during which either private rights or the community 
welfare claimed a position of ascendancy.13 The discussion also roots Lucas in a 
geophysical contextbetween the bookends of Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane 
Katrina. Noting the continuing vulnerability of the southeastern coastal region to 
severe storms, this section ponders whether the Court would decide Lucas 
differently today in light of new learning on wetlands, hurricanes, and global 
warming. As discussed in Part IV, after Lucas, nuisance law is new in two 
                                                
10 See infra Part III.C.1. 
11 See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the work of Professors Michael Blumm, Richard Lazarus, and 
others). 
12 See infra Part V.C.4. 
13 See infra Part II. 
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critical respects. First, it has developed from a defense to takings liability into an 
offensive claim for common law nuisance, and beyond to a catalyst for legislative 
action. Second, nuisance has a new substantive aspect. As the Lucas Court made 
clear, the doctrine should evolve in conformity with changed circumstances or 
new knowledge.14 Part V considers the applicability of the new nuisance doctrine 
to three of the most crucial environmental problems of our timewetland 
destruction, sprawling land patterns, and global warming.  
I. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS IMBALANCE 
Rights are not the language of democracy. Compromise is what democracy is 
about. Rights are the language of freedom, and are absolute because their role is 
to protect our liberty. By using the absolute power of freedom to accomplish 
reforms of democracy, we have undermined democracy and diminished our 
freedom. 
 
The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America (1996)15 
 
In a healthy society, there is a rough give-and-take between individual 
autonomy and community well-being. For centuries, nuisance law has been 
assigned the task of balancing such competing interests, weighing the common 
law property rights of individuals against those of the neighboring landowner or 
community. More recently, nuisance law has been supplemented (or even 
supplanted) with statutes designed to protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare, and the environment. Both nuisance law and public interest legislation 
are, at their core, enterprises involving balance and compromise.  
 
Increasingly, however, advocates have employed the language of rights 
to lend moral heft to their side of the scale. In 1985 Professor Richard Epstein laid 
the groundwork for expanding the constitutional dimension of property, arguing 
that individual rights should be limited by a governmental police power no 
broader than the power of eminent domain.16 In 1992, the United States Supreme 
                                                
14 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. Justice Stevens dissenting opinion expanded upon this evolutionary 
potential, asserting that a new appreciation of the importance of wetlands . . . and the 
vulnerability of coastal lands shapes our evolving understandings of property rights. Id. at 1069-
70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
15 PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 168 
(1996) (condemning modern society as excessively bureaucratic and law-driven). Although the 
authors criticism was directed at what he perceives to be excessive governmental regulation, it 
might be applied with equal force to the excesses of modern property rights advocates.  
16 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
332 (1985) (asking what minimum of additional power . . . must be added for the state to become 
more than a voluntary protective association and to acquire the exclusive use of force within its 
territory? and concluding that the only additional power needed is the states right to force 
exchanges of property rights [through eminent domain] that leave individuals with rights more 
valuable than those they have been deprived of). 
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Court embraced Epsteins philosophy, at least in part, in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.17 Critics of Epstein and Lucas assert that [n]otwithstanding the 
typical rhetoric of the takings debate, government officials are defenders of 
property rights.18 Arguing for an evenhanded application the language of 
rights. these critics contend that [a]n aggressive use of the Takings Clause to 
undermine land use controls does not promote property rights generally, but rather 
promotes the property rights of a select few at the expense of the majority of 
property owners.19  
 
Today, the absolutist language of rightsparticularly when linked to the 
constitutional regulatory takings doctrinehas the potential to stifle the 
discussion of important social and environmental policies. As commentators have 
warned, unyielding rights talk should be used with care to avoid the suppression 
of democratic debate.20 Part I surveys the modern property rights movement, 
highlighting the techniques it uses to shape public opinion in a manner solicitous 
of private landowners and distrustful of public interest regulation.21  
                                                
17 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing to Epsteins work for 
general propositions of regulatory takings law). Epstein was also one of the authors of a Lucas 
amicus brief filed on behalf of the Institute for Justice. See 505 U.S. at 1005. A discussion of 
Lucas appears in infra Part II. 
18 DOUGLAS KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING TAKINGS 
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 9-10 (2000), available at 
http://communityrights.org/legalresources/Handbook/HBintro.asp (visited Dec. 30, 2005). See 
also ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE (1995), available at 
www.uexcity.com/environmentprobe/pridon/index.html. 
19 KENDALL, supra. 
20 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991). 
21 As one who teaches Property in the law school curriculum, I must acknowledge that property 
professors may contribute to this distrust of governmental regulation. As another Property 
professor has written, the traditional bundle of sticks metaphor may discount the value of public 
interest regulation:  
One individual's interest in land cannot be defined without taking into account 
the interests of neighbors and the larger human and natural communities. For 
example, filling (or draining) a wetland might be considered a property interest 
belonging to the owner of tract on which it laysa stick in his bundle. Yet in 
wiping out the wetland the owner affects drainage on the rest of his landhis 
whole bundle of sticksand may well affect the drainage of his neighbors' 
lands, represented by their bundles. . . . [F]rom a social and ecological 
perspective, the [bundle of sticks] metaphor presents a false reality, one that 
cannot be squared with the values that underlie the present day understanding of 
what it means to own land. 
Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 
ENVTL. L. 773, 775-76 (2002).  
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A.  Supersizing Property Rights 
The modern property rights movement is an important social phenomenon, 
and it would be little exaggeration to consider it as a manifestation of the 
American propensity toward supersizing.22 Property rightsparticularly those 
relating to real propertyhave expanded in at least three important dimensions.  
 
First, the size of homes has been increasing over time. Between 1987 and 
2001, the size of the average new home in the United States increased by over 
20%, from 1900 square feet to 2300 square feet.23 By 2003, approximately 20% 
of new homes exceeded 3000 square feet in size.24 Simultaneously, household 
size has decreased, thereby inflating the average per capita square footage of 
homes.25  
 
Second, the profile of property owners has changed over time, 
increasingly including individuals with expansive property portfolios 
encompassing more than the traditional family home. In 2004, for example, 
approximately 38% of the housing stock was used for something other than the 
owners principal residence.26 Similarly, farms today may be owned by large 
agribusinesses, rather than by families: between 1900 and 1990, the average farm 
                                                
22 The word supersize appeared in the 2003-05 edition of WEBSTERS NEW MILLENNIUM 
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH, defined as a verb meaning to increase the size of something ordered, 
esp. a food item and as an adjective meaning extremely large; enormous. See WEBSTERS NEW 
MILLENNIUM DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., version 0.9.6 May 5, 2005) 
(online edition). The word received considerable media attention when it was used in the title of 
Morgan Spurlocks 2004 documentary, Super Size Me: A Film of Epic Proportions. See A.O. 
Scott, Film Review: When All Those Big Macs Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004 (describing 
film as an affable, muckraking documentary).  
23 Jennifer Evans-Cowley, McMansions: Supersized Houses, Supersized Regulations, TERRA 
GRANDE, Jan. 2005, available at http://recenter.tamu.edu (citing to 2002 study by the National 
Association of Home Builders). 
24 This represents an almost 100% increase in large home construction between 1988 (11% of new 
homes exceeded 3000 square feet) and 2003 (20% of new homes exceeded 3000 square feet). Id. 
(citing to U.S. Census Bureau data).  
25 Id. (citing to U.S. Census Bureau data, noting that average household size decreased from 3.11 
persons in 1970 to 2.59 persons in 2000).  
26 A study by the National Association of Realtors found that the 2004 housing stock consisted of 
72.1 million owner-occupied homes, 37.2 million investment units, and 6.6 million vacation 
homes. See National Association of Realtors, Second Homes, Mar. 9, 2005, available at 
http://www.realtor.org/publicaffairsweb.nsf (visited Dec. 31, 2005). Between 1985 and 1995 (and 
as adjusted for inflation), the amount spent on vacation homes alone (as opposed to principal 
residences or investment properties) rose from $6.2 billion to $13.2 billion. Zhu Xiao et al., 
Second Homes: What, How Many, Where and Who, at 2 (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 
Harvard University, N01-2, 2001). 
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grew from 147 to 461 acres, as the percentage of farmers declined from 38% to 
2.6% of the national labor force.27  
 
Finally, property rights have also become supersized in terms of 
political influence. Numerous advocacy groups oppose government regulation 
that restricts the use of private property.28 Following the blueprint of Richard 
Epstein, advocates argue, 
 
[The] regulatory bureaucracy has become so large, unaccountable, 
and powerful that Congress effectively has forfeited meaningful 
oversight. . . . This leaves victimized private citizens, especially 
smaller landowners and business persons, with the near-
insurmountable burden of challenging the governments intrusive 
land-use control in the courts.29 
 
Accordingly, Epsteinian reformers promote an agenda expanding the force of 
property rights, thereby invalidating many modern health, safety, and 
environmental regulations.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 U.S. Dept of Agric., Agriculture in the Classroom, Growing a Nation: The Story of American 
Agriculture (timeline), available at http://www.agclassroom.org/gan/timeline/farmers_land.htm 
(visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
28 Critics have dubbed as the Takings Project the aggressive use of the regulatory takings 
doctrine to oppose property regulation. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings 
Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
509, 511 (1998) (identifying as blueprint for takings doctrine RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)). Kendall and Lord argue that 
the Project has been supported by an annual budget of approximately $15 million, supplied by 
pro-development foundations, associations, attorneys, and individuals. See id. at 539-45. Kendall 
and Lord assert that the Projects budget is dedicated, in part, to the staging of meetings, 
workshops, and all-expense paid seminars for judges. See id. at 546-50. See also Ann Southworth, 
Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of Public Interest Law, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1223 (2005).  
29 M. David Stirling, Move Over Saddam: Overzealous Regulators Also Threaten Freedom, Feb. 
25, 2003, available at 
http://www.pacificlegal.org/view_SearchDetail.asp?tid=Commentary&sField=CommentaryID&iI
D=77 (visited Feb. 11, 2006). 
30 Kendall & Lord, supra note 28. 
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B.  Sanctifying Property Owners 
 
Our God-given property rights are being stolen from us little by little. 
 
The Constitution Party of Oregon31 
 
The property rights movement has derived much of its force from a careful 
choice of rhetoric. Despite the modern supersizing of property rights and 
landowners, advocates strategically employ language that evokes the sympathetic 
image of small landowners as a vulnerable David struggling against an 
oppressive governmental Goliath. At least two rhetorical techniques have been 
employed in an attempt to advance the position of property owners who desire to 
be free from government regulation. 
 
First, property advocates sanctify landowners by linking the goal of 
unfettered land use to noble causes of the past. The Defenders of Property Rights, 
for example, compares its mission to that of the civil rights movement: Just as 
segregation led to the civil rights movement in the 1960s, government intrusion 
on property rightslargely in the name of protecting the environmenthas 
sparked a new crusade to protect an individuals right to use and own all forms of 
and interests in private property.32 Similarly, the Washington Legal Foundations 
chief legal counsel explains, I look upon us as the bearers of the torch of the civil 
rights movement. . . . I see us as successors to Martin Luther King and Thurgood 
Marshall.33 Other advocates search for an even higher moral ground, describing 
the protection of property rights in religious terms. The Constitution Party of 
Oregon, for example, sought to recall a state judge who had held unconstitutional 
a voter-approved property rights initiative, complaining that [o]ur God-given 
property rights are being stolen from us little by little, and unless we take action 
now, there will remain little left to us but the priveledge [sic] of paying property 
taxes.34 
 
                                                
31 See The Constitution Part of Oregon, Petition Drive for Recall, Judge James PAC, Nov. 9, 
2005, available at http://www.constitutionpartyoregon.net (visited Dec. 9, 2005) (criticizing 
MacPherson v. Dept of Admin. Serv., No. 05C10444 (Or. Cir. Ct. Marion County 2005)). 
32 Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in 
LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 24 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995), cited by 
Kendall & Lord, supra note 28, at n.133. Marzulla is the founder and president of Defenders of 
Property Rights, an organization which describes itself as the only national public-interest legal 
foundation dedicated exclusively to the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights. See 
http://www.yourpropertyrights.org.  
33 Richard Perez-Pena, A Rights Movement that Emerges from the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
1994 (quoting Richard Samp, chief legal counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation), cited in 
Kendall & Lord, supra note 28, at n.135.  
34 See supra note. 
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As a second method of sanctifying landowners, advocates employ a 
victimization technique, choosing particularly sympathetic landowners as clients 
and portraying them as martyrs for their cause. For example, the Pacific Legal 
Foundation (PLF)35 took up the appeal of an ailing widow in Suitum v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency.36 In its press release describing Suitums challenge 
before the Supreme Court to land use regulations promulgated by the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, the PLF referred to its client as a wheelchair-bound 
old widow who is rapidly losing her sight.37 To explain its clients twelve year 
delay in seeking a building permit, the PLF argued: In 1972, John and Bernadine 
Suitum bought an 18,300 square foot lot in a residential subdivision in Incline 
Village, not far from Lake Tahoe. The only reason why hers is the last lot that has 
not yet been developed is because Mrs. Suitums late husband spent the last years 
of his life battling illness.38  
 
Similarly, in United States v. Rapanos,39 the PLF represented a Michigan 
commercial developer who drained and filled wetlands without applying for the 
requisite federal permit under the Clean Water Act, proceeding in defiance of 
several federal cease and desist orders.40 The PLF portrayed its client 
sympathetically, describing him as a 70-year-old Michigan grandfather who for 
nearly two decades has fought overzealous government prosecutors seeking 
prison time and more than $10 million in fees and fines because he failed to get a 
federal permit before moving soil on his own property.41 
                                                
35 The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) is a pro-development, non-profit legal foundation that has 
been a "leading force" in the litigation campaign for private property rights. Kendall & Lord, 
supra note 28, at 539-40. PLF terms itself a "representative in the courts for Americans who have 
grown weary of overregulation by big government, over-indulgence by the courts, and excessive 
interference in the American way of life." Pacific Legal Foundation, About Us, 
http://pacificlegal.org/PLFProfile.asp (visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
36 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 US. 725 (1997). The Agencys land use 
planning process was challenged more recently in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (rejecting claim that moratoria prohibiting 
virtually all development for a 32-month period constituted a categorical taking). 
37 James S. Burling, Widow Suitum Fights a Strange Doctrine (press release by PLFs Director 
of Property Rights), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/ 
(visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
38 Id. 
39 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).  
40 Id. 
41 Pacific Legal Foundation, Supreme Court to Hear Landmark Wetlands Case: PLF Asks High 
Court to Set Wetlands Law Straight, Oct. 11, 2005. The Sixth Circuit described Rapanos in less 
sympathetic terms. In observing that Rapanos had been displeased by the report of his own 
consultant, Dr. Goff, which found 48-58 acres of protected wetlands on one of Rapanos 
commercial properties, the court noted:  
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The victimization technique has not been confined to individual 
landowners, but has been applied as well to large corporations. In attempting to 
portray Wal-Mart as the victim of city planning, the PLF asserted in a press 
release that city officials relentless attacks on Wal-Mart [represent] paternalistic 
poli[cies] that [do] nothing but deny entry-level employment opportunities to 
those who need them the most; an attempt to keep out basic goods at affordable 
prices; and an assault on the right of Wal-Mart to do business.42 The Foundation 
concludes, Free markets and freedom of choice: These American values are the 
true victims of this war on the Wal-Marts of this world. Consumers must . . . tell 
their city representatives to stop discriminating against businesses, large and 
small. Its the American thing to do.43 
C.  Demonizing the Public Interest 
[W]etlands regulations, like the Endangered Species Act, have been used to rob 
citizens of the use of millions of acres of private land. 
 
How Wetlands Threaten Freedom (2006)44 
                                                                                                                                
Upset by the report, Mr. Rapanos ordered Dr. Goff to destroy both the report 
and map, as well as all references to Mr. Rapanos in Dr. Goff's files. However, 
Dr. Goff was unwilling to do so. Mr. Rapanos stated he would destroy Dr. 
Goff if he did not comply, claiming that he would do away with the report and 
bulldoze the site himself, regardless of Dr. Goff's findings.  
United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded sub. nom 
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).  
See also J. David Breemer, The Wisdom of Growth: What Can California Learn from a Recent 
Property Rights Proposition in Oregonthe State Long Viewed as an Anti-Sprawl Mecca?, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 12, 2004 (PLF staff attorney criticizes local forest ordinance, 
complaining [a]ll that Thomas and Doris Dodd wanted to do was build a retirement home on 40 
acres of land they purchased in 1983. . . . But the county wanted the land as a forest preserve, so it 
passed an ordinance banning construction on the Dodds property, destroying their American 
dream). See also Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230. (6th Cir. 1998) (denying 
Dodds claim that application of zoning ordinance worked a regulatory taking, in part because 
landowners six-year delay in subject construction project defeated their claim to reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations). 
42 Paul J. Beard II, An Assault on Freedom (press release by PLF staff attorney), available at 
http://www.pacificlegal.org/view_SearchDetail.asp?tid=Commentary&sField=CommentaryID&iI
D=140 (visited Feb. 11, 2006).. 
43 Id. 
44 Jane Chastain, How Wetlands Threaten Freedom, WORLDNETDAILY, June 29, 2006, 
available at http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50830 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006) (describing petitioners in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) as modern-day 
freedom fighters [who fought the federal government for the right to develop land they owned in 
the state of Michigan]). 
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As a corollary to the sanctification of landowners, property advocates try 
to diminish the importance of the public interest. Drawing support from those 
who criticize big government, advocates conflate environmental regulation with 
the size of government. Such rhetoric taps into the privatization movement that 
seeks to replace numerous government programs with private sector operations. 
In recent times, the call for privatization has influenced such stalwart government 
programs as welfare, medicare, and social security. Even the conduct of war has 
been privatized.45 Supporters of both privatization and strong individual property 
rights distrustand at times, even scorngovernment regulation conducted in 
the name of the public interest.  
 
At least two techniques promote the demonization of the public interest. 
First, property advocates portray the government as a bully. In Rapanos, for 
example, the Pacific Legal Foundation asserted, Mr. Rapanos case is about 
federal power, not protecting wetlands. Federal officials have been exploiting the 
Clean Water Act to bully and take land and money from property owners for far 
too long. . . .46 Likewise, property groups have variously criticized land use 
regulations as [the embodiment of the] selfish demands of established 
neighborhood groups or single issue environmental constituencies47 and as 
nothing more than an attempt to control at the federal level how and where 
people live, work, and travel by depriving homeowners and small businesses of 
choice.48 Moreover, Wal-Mart has cast local zoning regulations affecting its 
stores as tantamount to Nazi book-burnings in the 1930s.49 
                                                
45 See Greg Guma, Privatizing War, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER, July 7, 2004 (progressive 
critique of privatization, alleging that [d]uring the first Gulf War, about two percent of U.S. 
military personnel were private workers. As of 2003, it had reached 10 percent. The Pentagon 
employs more than 700,000 private contractors, and at least $33 billion of the $416 billion in 
military spending overwhelmingly approved by the Senate [in June 2004] will go to [private 
military corporations]), available at http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-
bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0707-14.htm (visited Jan. 22, 2006). See also Clifford J. Rosky, Force, 
Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. 
REV. 879 (2004).  
46 Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 41 (quoting Reed Hopper, principal PLF attorney).  
47 Brief of the National Association of Home Builders and the International Council of Shopping 
Centers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner [hereinafter, NAHB, Lucas Brief] at *6, Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), available at 1991 WL 
11004084. 
48 Defenders of Property Rights, Property Rights and Smart Growth Policies, available at 
http://www.yourpropertyrights.org/index.asp. (criticizing smart growth regulations as stifling 
property rights, economic development, and civil rights and den[ying] the dream of home 
ownership). 
49 In response to a ballot referendum in Flagstaff, Arizona opposing the construction of a new 
Wal-Mart store, the company placed an ad in the Arizona Daily Sunfeaturing a photo of a 1933 
Nazi book burning in Berlinwith the caption, Should we let government tell us what we can 
read? . . . So why should we allow local government to limit where we shop? Or how much of a 
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As a second method of demonizing the public interest, property advocates 
employ a no harm technique, denying that the actions of individual landowners 
have adverse consequences upon the community and its natural environment. In 
Suitum, for example, the Pacific Legal Foundation complained that government 
regulators never presented any evidence that there would be any environmental 
harm [to the Lake Tahoe Basin] if Mrs. Suitum is allowed to build the properly 
constructed modest retirement home of her dreams.50 Similarly, in Lucas, the 
National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) submitted an amicus brief in 
support of landowner/developer Lucas, denying that the development of certain 
coastal land would cause any harm.51 The NAHB argued As the united voice of 
the home building industry in America, the NAHB cannot let pass the central idea 
in the legislation before this Court, i.e., that there is something so nefarious about 
the building of a home that home construction can be condemned as a nuisance.52 
Although petitioner Lucas developed expensive homes in one of the nations 
wealthiest communities, the NAHB portrayed his actions as both harmless and 
noble: In an economic era when people find themselves compelled to seek large 
packing crates for shelter, there seems something oddly surreal in condemning the 
construction of homes as a nuisance which is so heinous that it can be prevented 
without any thought of compensating the landowner.53 
                                                                                                                                
stores floor space can be used to sell groceries? . . . Choice is a freedom worth keeping. See 
Wal-Mart Watch, Shameless: How Wal-Mart Bullies its Way into Communities Across America, 
available at http://walmartwatch.com (reproducing Wal-Mart advertisement in Arizona Daily Sun, 
May 5, 2005). 
50 Burling, Widow Suitum, supra note 37. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307-08 (2002) (recounting how the lakes 
unsurpassed beauty . . . is the wellspring of its undoing and noting that the upsurge of 
development in the area [] caused increased nutrient loading of the lake largely because of the 
impervious coverage of land in the Basin resulting from that development). 
51 NAHB, Lucas Brief, supra note 47. The parties to the litigation had stipulated to the contrary. In 
particular, for purposes of the litigation, petitioner Lucas stipulated that the subject beach/dune 
area of South Carolinas shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new 
construction contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that 
discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a 
great public harm. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1022 (1992) 
(quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991)). 
52 NAHB, Lucas Brief, supra at *4. 
53 Id. 
 
 
14
II. LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL: THROUGH THE EYE OF THE 
HURRICANE 
A. The Lucas Rule: Environmental Cynicism 
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or 
productive options for its usetypically, as here, by requiring land to be left 
substantially in its natural statecarry with them a heightened risk that private 
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of 
mitigating serious public harm.54 
 
Lucas represents one of the modern Courts most important applications of 
the regulatory takings doctrine. It also illustrates what this article calls 
environmental cynicism, the Courts inability to appreciate the value of 
undisturbed nature, and the Courts doubt that the destruction of natural 
landscapes through development causes measurable harm to neighboring 
communities. 55 
 
The facts of Lucas are straightforward: The plaintiff/petitioner, David 
Lucas, claimed that a South Carolina statute limiting development of his 
beachfront property on the Isle of Palms worked a regulatory taking for which the 
state owed compensation.56 For purposes of the litigation, Lucas conceded that 
discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is 
necessary to prevent a great public harm.57 However, Lucas convinced the lower 
court that the challenged development restrictions had rendered his lots 
valueless, a finding the Supreme Court did not disturb.58 Under traditional 
regulatory takings analysisas outlined in Penn Central Transportation Company 
v. City of New Yorkthe severe economic impact to Lucass property caused by 
South Carolinas regulation might be offset by the critical governmental safety 
objective.59 As the Penn Central Court had suggested in 1978, a taking may 
                                                
54Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (emphasis supplied). 
55See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring Whats Environmental About Environmental Law in 
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L.R. 703 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to 
appreciate environmental law as a distinct area of law during the past three decades).  
56 The relevant statute was the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. See S.C. Code Ann. § 
48-39-290(A). As applied to the Lucas property, the statute had the direct effect of barring 
petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1007. 
57 Id. at 1020. 
58 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006. 
59 Penn Central Transp. Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying 
several analytical factors of particular significance, including the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action). 
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more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as 
a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.60 In holding for the petitioner, the Lucas Court declined to apply 
the traditional Penn Central analysis. Instead, the Court created a new total 
takings categorical rule, requiring governments to compensate landowners 
whenever regulation deprives land of all economically beneficial use.61 
 
The Isle of Palms was no ordinary community, rendering Lucas a tale of 
supersized property rights. In 2000, the area boasted a median household income 
81% above the national average.62 For his part, David Lucas was no ordinary 
landowner. In 1984, Lucas headed up a development partnership that purchased 
the Wild Dunes Beach and Racquet Club on the Isle of Palms for twenty-five 
million dollars.63 The partnership, Wild Dunes Associates, developed an exclusive 
1500-acre gated community that included 2500 residences and vacation homes, 
two golf courses, and a large marina.64 The project made Lucas a wealthy man, 
generating $100 million in sales by its second year.65 In 1986, Lucas sold off his 
interest in the partnership. Just months later, he re-purchased for himself two of 
the last undeveloped beachfront lots for the sum of $975,000. The fate of these 
two lotssevered from some 2500 other lots in the resortwould become the 
limited focus of the Supreme Court litigation.66 
                                                
60 Id. 
61 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27. 
62 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS, available at http://www.epodunk.com/cgi-
bin/genInfo.php?locIndex=13199 (reporting the local median household income on the Isle of 
Palms as $76,170 and the national median household income as $41,994).  
63 VICKI BEEN, LUCAS V. THE GREEN MACHINE: USING THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO PROMOTE MORE 
EFFICIENT REGULATION? (2004).  
64 The golf courses were ranked among the best in the world, and the marina was one of the largest 
facilities in the southeastern United States. Been, supra, at n.22 . 
65 Id. at n. 23 . 
66 Some have speculated that the bifurcation of the sale and purchase transactions was a strategic 
decision to frame Lucass position in more sympathetic terms, should litigation erupt: 
Although it is hard to understand why Lucas would have acquired the lots at the 
high end of fair market value after he had cashed in . . . , its much easier to 
understand why he might want to describe his acquisition that way if attention 
were ever focused on the transaction. . . . [I]f one were trying to position the 
transaction for purposes of a subsequent takings lawsuit, it undoubtedly would 
be preferable to be seen as a little guy with just two lots whose value was 
destroyed than to be cast as a wealthy developer of more than 2500 homes, 
prevented from building on just two lots. 
Id. at n. 34 . 
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The Courts environmental cynicism led it to create a new categorical rule 
of governmental liability, rejecting the states argument that it had acted to 
mitigate serious public harm when it refused to approve Lucas building plans. 
For example, South Carolina presented evidence that undeveloped lands provide 
valuable protection against coastal storms and hurricanes, and that for roughly 
half of the last 40 years, all or part of [the Lucas] property was part of the beach 
or flooded twice daily.67 In addition, petitioner Lucas conceded the validity of 
the statutory purpose, accepting legislative findings that an undisturbed 
beach/dune zone protects life and property by serving as a storm barrier which 
dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an economical and 
effective manner.68 Despite such evidence, the Court accepted the premise that 
oceanfront lands are valueless in their natural state.69 The majority dismissed as 
meaningless legislative findings that coastal development must be regulated to 
prevent harm to the community, concluding that [because] such a justification 
can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the 
legislature has a stupid staff.70 
 
As it announced its new rule, the Court also sowed the seeds of its 
destruction. The Court predicted that the rule would apply in only extraordinary 
or relatively rare circumstances.71 The concurring and dissenting justices went 
                                                
67 Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, 
The area is notoriously unstable. . . . Between 1957 and 1963, petitioners 
property was under water. Between 1963 and 1973, the shoreline was 100 to 150 
feet onto petitioners property. In 1973, the first line of stable vegetation was 
about halfway through the property. Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms 
issued 12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the Wild 
Dunes development [and a state agency determined that habitable structures 
were in imminent danger of collapse].  
505 U.S. at 1038-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
68 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021. 
69 See supra note. The majority stated, [w]hether Lucass construction of single-family residences 
on his parcels should be described as bringing harm to South Carolinas adjacent ecological 
resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that the States use interest 
in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent use must yield. Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1025. But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that the 
Court offers no basis for its assumption that the only uses of property cognizable under the 
Constitution are developmental uses). 
70 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12. See also id. at 1010 (suggesting that main legislative goals were 
to promote tourism and to create natural habitat, rather than to prevent development amounting to 
a public nuisance).  
71 Id. at 1016, 1018. Ten years later, the Court clarified that the Lucas rule applies to permanent 
regulatory takings only: "Lucas carved out a narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory 
takings for the 'extraordinary circumstance' of a permanent deprivation of all beneficial use." 
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further, doubting even that the new rule applied to the case at bardescribing the 
lower courts finding that the development regulation had rendered Lucass lots 
valueless as curious72 and almost certainly erroneous.73 Moreover, the Court 
was quick to establish a defense to its new rule. As Justice Stevens noted wryly in 
dissent, Like many bright line rules, the categorical rule established in this case 
is only categorical for a page or two in the U.S. Reports. No sooner does the 
Court state that total regulatory takings must be compensated than it quickly 
establishes an exception to that rule.74 
B. The Lucas Defense: New Nuisance as Evolutionary, Antecedent Inquiry 
The Court tempered its new categorical rule with a governmental defense 
of apparently limited scope. Relying heavily upon judges, rather than legislators, 
to establish the proper balance between private rights and the public interest, the 
Court set forth the new nuisance defense that is the focus of this article: 
 
[Regulations that deprive property of all economically beneficial 
use] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in . . . the restrictions that 
background principles of the States law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an 
effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result 
that could have been achieved in the courtsby adjacent 
landowners . . . under the States law of private nuisance, or by the 
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect 
the public generally, or otherwise.75  
 
In traditional nuisance terms the Court explained that the owner of a lake-bed . . . 
for example, would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the 
requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of 
flooding others land.76 In dissent, Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for its 
elevation of longstanding judicial judgments above legislative judgments, arguing 
                                                                                                                                
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Authority, 535 U.S. 302, 542 
n.19 (2002).  
72 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
73 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
74 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
75 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.  
76 Id. at 1029. 
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[t]here is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They determined 
a harm in the same way as state judges and legislators do today.77  
 
 The Court added two brief qualifications to its new defense that would 
prove to be surprisingly beneficial to future government defendants.78 First, the 
Court explained that to resist compensation, the state must demonstrate that the 
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owners estate shows that the 
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.79 This reference 
to an antecedent inquiry would develop into an important affirmative defense 
for government litigants.80 Moreover, Justice Kennedys concurrence provided an 
important reminder that nuisance law is fundamentally evolutionary, such that 
changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously 
permissible no longer so.81 As a result, the State should not be prevented from 
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions.82 
C. The Lucas Bookends: From Hurricane Hugo to Hurricane Katrina 
By viewing Lucas through the lens of the regions recurrent experience 
with hurricanes, this section brings the Courts environmental cynicism into sharp 
focus. From Hurricane Hugo (1989) to Hurricane Katrina (2005) and beyond, the 
southeastern United States has been pummeled repeatedly by coastal storms and 
hurricanes. The site of Lucasthe Isle of Palms, South Carolinawas 
particularly vulnerable. As a barrier island, the area was notoriously unstable.83 
As defined by one South Carolina state agency, barrier islands are tidewater 
landforms that protect the mainland from the effects of sea storms, [and] are 
characterized by an ever-changing beach, sand dunes, maritime forest and salt 
marsh.84 
 
                                                
77 Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
78 See Michael C. Blumm, Lucass Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as 
Categorical Takings Defense, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005). 
79 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added). 
80 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
81 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
82 Id. at 1035. 
83 See supra note. 
84 South Carolina Dept of Parks, Recreation & Tourism, Discover Carolina: Life and Death of a 
Barrier IslandVocabulary List, available at 
http://www.discovercarolina.com/html/s05nature104a01e.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007). 
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Prior to the 1992 decision in Lucas, South Carolina had a long history as a 
target of deadly storms, including significant activity in 1893, 1916, 1940, 1954 
(Hurricane Hazel), 1959 (Hurricane Gracie), and 1989 (Hurricane Hugo).85 
Just three years prior to the Courts decision in Lucas, Hurricane Hugo had struck 
the very island in disputethe Isle of Palmsleading to thirty-five fatalities and 
six billion dollars in damage.86 Despite the seriousness of these storms, only the 
dissenting Justices in Lucas would have upheld the application of South 
Carolinas protective legislation. Drawing from the hard lessons of 
experience,87 Justice Stevens found that the states argument that the 
beach/dune system [acts] as a buffer from high tides, storm surge, [and] 
hurricanes had much science on its side.88 Likewise, dissenting Justice 
Blackmun argued that uncontrolled beachfront development can cause serious 
damage to life and property by destroy[ing] the natural sand dune barriers that 
provide storm breaks.89 He worried that beachfront buildings are not only 
themselves destroyed [by hurricanes], but they are often driven, like battering 
rams, into adjacent inland homes.90 
 
After Lucas, the storm pattern continued, both in South Carolina and in the 
broader southeastern region of the United States. Less than one month after the 
Court decided Lucas, Hurricane Andrew made landfall along the Gulf Coast of 
Louisiana and Florida, leading to forty deaths and thirty billion dollars in property 
damage.91 Subsequent years witnessed additional deadly storms. In 2004, nine 
tropical storms caused over forty-two billion dollars in damage, more than one 
hundred deaths along the Atlantic coast of the United States, and some three 
                                                
85 SOUTH CAROLINA CLIMATE OFFICE PUBLICATIONS, HURRICANES, South Carolina Hurricane 
Facts, available at http://www.dnr.sc.gov/climate/schurr_pub.html (visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
86 Id. 
87 Respondents Brief on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina, at 
*31, available at 1992 WL 672613 (1992) (arguing that legislative policies regulating coastal 
development are not based upon abstract conclusions that building on barrier islands like the Isle 
of Palms is dangerous to life and property and significantly damaging to the fragile beach/dune 
system). 
88 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
89 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1037 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (drawing lessons from 29 deaths and $6 
billion in property damage caused by Hurricane Hugo in 1989). 
90 Id. 
91 After the Storm: Hurricane Andrew Ten Years Later, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, available at 
http://www.sptimes/2002/webspecials02/andrew/ (describing hurricanes path across south Florida 
and Louisiana). 
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thousand deaths in Haiti.92 The 2005 storm season would be even more severe for 
the United States, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf coast on 
August 29 and September 24, respectively. Causing a storm surge of twenty-nine 
feet, Katrina flooded approximately eighty percent of the city of New Orleans, all 
of St. Bernard Parish, and sections of two other parishes.93 The storm resulted in 
the death of 1,420 people and caused $75 billion dollars in damage.94 Hurricane 
Rita, the fourth most intense Atlantic hurricane ever recorded, caused some ten 
billion dollars in damage.95 
 
Although analysis is ongoing, several lessons have emerged from these 
disasters.96 First, wetlands are valuable resources that moderate the impacts of 
coastal storms and hurricanes. The General Accounting Office likens wetlands to 
speed bump[s], slowing down storms almost as dry land does.97 Although not 
free from dispute, there is evidence that that every 2.7 linear miles of coastal 
wetlands can reduce the height of storm surges by one foot.98 Second, natural 
disasters such as hurricanes can be exacerbated by human activity. For example, 
Louisiana and other Gulf States were rendered increasingly vulnerable to 
hurricanes as coastal wetlands were destroyed. The Congressional Research 
Service reports that [i]t is now believed that more than 1.2 million acres [of Gulf 
                                                
92 National Climatic Data Center, Climate of 2004: Atlantic Hurricane Season, Dec. 13, 2004, 
available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2004/hurricanes04.html (visited Mar. 
6, 2006). 
93 Wikipedia, Hurricane Katrina, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane Katrina 
(visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
94 Id.  
95 Wikipedia, Hurricane Rita, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Rita (visited 
Aug. 23, 2006). 
96 For a compilation of information about Louisianas coastal wetlands derived from experts in the 
field and sponsored by the Americas Wetland campaign, see 
http://www.americaswetlandresources.com/. 
97 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nations Preparedness, Response, and 
Recovery Activities, at *7, Sept. 28, 2005 (GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina) (noting that 
wetlands, once regarded as unimportant areas to be filled or drained . . . are now recognized for 
[a] variety of important functions . . . including providing flood control by slowing down and 
absorbing excess water during storms . . . and protecting coastal and upland areas from erosion). 
98 Bob Sullivan, Wetlands Erosion Raises Hurricane Risks, MSNBS, Aug. 29, 2005 (quoting 
Sidney Coffee, executive assistant to the governor for coastal activities); Louisiana Sea Grant, 
Louisiana Hurricane Recovery Resources, available at 
http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/wetlands.htm (quoting Rex Caffey, Louisiana Sea Grant 
College Program, Louisiana State University Ag Center for the proposition that [a]t a minimum, 
we can say that the net loss of 1.2 million acres of coastal wetlands has definitely increased the 
vulnerability and exposure of Louisianas critical coastal infrastructure). 
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Coast] wetlands, an area approximately the size of Delaware, has been converted 
to open water since the 1930s.99  
 
In light of these changed circumstances and new knowledge, would 
the Court decide Lucas differently today?100 Some evidence suggests a negative 
response, indicating that the Supreme Court remains skeptical that wetlands 
function as natural flood control systems, at least in the context of non-coastal, 
interior wetlands.101 Despite the Supreme Courts continued environmental 
cynicism, state courts and the lower federal courts appear more willing to 
incorporate new learning into their background principles of property law and 
nuisance.102 
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM: LUCAS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for youask 
what you can do for your country.  
 
President John F. Kennedy (1961)103 
 
[W]e must be clear about our purposes. The aim here is efficiency, not austerity. 
. . . Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis 
all by itself for sound, comprehensive energy policy. 
 
Vice President Dick Cheney (2001)104 
 
                                                
99 Jeffrey Zinn, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the Coastal Louisiana Ecosystem Restoration, at 
*2, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (RS22276), Sept. 26, 2005. 
100 In a different environmental context, the Court has changed course in light of new learning 
about the danger of certain methods of coal extraction. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding Kohler Act worked a regulatory taking, despite asserted public 
safety purpose of preventing mine-induced subsidence) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding state mining regulation does not work a regulatory 
taking, despite its striking similarity to the Kohler Act). See also See also M&J Coal Co. v. United 
States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that subsidence control plan was not a taking 
under Lucas nuisance defense); Department of Environmental Protection (Pennsylvania), A 
Homeowners Guide to Mine Subsidence, available at 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/MSIHomeowners/ (visited Mar. 6, 2006).  
101 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006). 
102 See infra Part IV. 
103 John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1961. 
104 Vice President Dick Cheney, Apr. 30, 2001 (remarks at the annual meeting of the Associated 
Press, Toronto, Ontario), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/print/vp20010430.html (visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
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Society has long struggled to achieve a balance between individual 
autonomy and the welfare of the community. From the perspective of the 
individual, this represents a search for balance between rights and responsibilities, 
and between personal freedom and sacrifice for the commonwealth. From the 
perspective of political theory, this represents a tension between the visions of 
government as laissez-faire-protector-of-vested-rights, and government as public-
interest-regulator. As discussed in Part I, property advocates have undertaken a 
highly-organized campaign over the past few decades to win public support for 
stronger individual rights, fewer individual responsibilities, and weaker 
governmental regulation.  
 
This section places the autonomy/community, rights/responsibilities 
tension into historical context, noting cycles during which one or the other of the 
competing philosophies has claimed a position of ascendancy. As a broad 
generalization, the discussion identifies the following dominant paradigms of the 
twentieth century: individualism (1900-1933); communitarianism (1933-81); and 
individualism (1981-2000). This section concludes by observing signs of a return 
to the spirit of community responsibility, coinciding roughly with the end of both 
the twentieth century and the Rehnquist Court.105  
A.  The Industrial Revolution: Promoting Individual Rights 
The rise of the modern industrialized world has dramatically changed the 
quality of life, in both positive and negative ways. The first wave of the industrial 
revolution occurred in Great Britain at the end of the 18th century. By the end of 
the 19th century, a second industrial revolution was occurring in the United 
States.106 Overall, the industrialization of the United States spawned a rational, 
but perhaps over-exuberant embrace of economic and industrial growth, often at 
the expense of other social values. Property rights were of paramount value 
during this time, even if the rights holder was a vast industry or corporation, 
rather than an identifiable human being. Popular culture reinforced this preference 
for autonomy and rights over community and responsibility. For example, the 
flapper society of the 1920s drew support from the popular contempt for 
prohibition and from a widespread disdain for authority.107 
 
Many judges of the early twentieth century embraced the new economic 
and social order with unquestioning faith in the virtue of progress, zealously 
                                                
105 See infra Part III.D. William H. Rehnquist was Chief Justice from September 26, 1986 to 
September 3, 2005. Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov (visited Aug. 2, 2006). 
106 See MSN Encarta, Industrial Revolution, available at 
http://Encarta.msn.com/text_761577952__0/Industrial_Revolution.html (visited Jan. 22, 2006). 
107 See Wikipedia, Flapper (entry in online encyclopedia), available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ (visited July 30, 2006). 
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protecting individual property and autonomy through substantive due process 
analysis. As illustrated by the now-discredited decision in Lochner v. New 
York,108 the Supreme Court then looked with distrust upon public interest 
legislation designed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of laborers by 
limiting the rights of industrial employers.109  
 
The case of the developing railroads presents another example of judicial 
solicitude for the maintenance of an industry relatively unfettered by 
governmental regulation. In articulating the well-known stop, look, and listen 
rule for railroad crossings, Justice Holmes 1927 observation serves as a metaphor 
for the march of progress: When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that 
he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is 
clear of the track. He knows that he must stop for the train not the train stop for 
him.110  
B. The New Deal and the Great Society: Promoting Community Welfare 
The Government cannot get along without you [community leaders]. The 
Federal, State, local Governments cant. The whole period we are going through 
will come back in the end to individual citizens, to individual responsibility, to 
private organization, through the years to come. 
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933)111 
 
[The Great Society] is a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of 
the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger 
 for community. 
 
President Lyndon B. Johnson (1964) 112 
                                                
108 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (reversing conviction of bakery owner for violating 
labor safety law setting maximum hours for New York bakers), overruled in part by Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).  
109 The Court indicated little interest in upholding laws pertaining to the health of the individual 
engaged in the occupation of a baker, particularly where such laws might hinder economic 
productivity. Lochner, supra at 57 (concluding that[clean] and wholesome bread does not depend 
upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week). But see id. at 70 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (claiming that bakery work was then notoriously difficult, involving a 
great deal of physical exertion in an overheated workshop, the constant inhaling of flour dust, 
and a reduced life span).  
110 Baltimore & O. Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (reversing 
judgment for estate of deceased automobile driver and establishing the rule that travelers must 
stop, look, and listen before crossing the tracks). 
111 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, An Extemporaneous Address Before the 1933 Conference on 
Mobilization for Human Needs, Sept. 8, 1933, available at 
http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1933h.htm. 
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As industrialization became more widespread, so also did its abuses. As a 
reaction to the excesses of the first wave of industrialization, the common law of 
negligence and nuisance evolved as remedies for torts, both direct and indirect.113 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the great leaders of industryheading 
powerful railroad, steel, oil, and tobacco corporationswould be simultaneously 
revered as captains of industry and scorned as robber barons.114 As an 
antidote to the latter, beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Congress 
began to pass legislation to protect the public from anticompetitive behavior.115 
 
 After the stock market crash of 1929, Congress turned its legislative 
attention to the restoration of the nations economic and social wellbeing. During 
the so-called New Deal era of the 1930s during the presidency of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, Congress passed a host of new public interest legislation, including the 
Social Security Act of 1935116 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.117 
 
President Roosevelts social legislation continued during the 1960s, as 
President Lyndon B. Johnsons Great Society program sought to bring an end to 
poverty and racial injustice.118 Johnsons initiative led to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,119 the Voting Rights Bill of 1965,120 and the creation of 
                                                                                                                                
112 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan, May 22, 1964, available 
at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640522.asp (visited Feb. 18, 
2006). 
113 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (W. Page Keeton, general ed.) (5th ed. 1984). 
The authors observe that the rise of nuisance during the first half of the 19th century in England 
coincided in a marked degree with the Industrial Revolution; and it very probably was stimulated 
by the rapid increase in the number of accidents caused by industrial machinery, and in particular 
by the invention of railways. Id. at 161. 
114 See generally, Wikipedia, Gilded Age (entry in online encyclopedia), available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilded_Age (visited July 30, 2006).  
115 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 et seq.). 
See also Valentine, supra (describing the Sherman Act as a congressional response to a popular 
outcry against the robber barons). 
116 Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). See 
generally, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY: A BRIEF HISTORY, available at 
www.socialsecurity.gov/history. 
117 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. At first, during the so-called 
Lochner era, the courts struck down many of these public interest statutes under substantive due 
process review designed to protect economic and property rights. See Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905).  
118 See generally, The White House, President George W. Bush, History & Tours, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/lj36.html. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
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Medicare,121 Medicaid,122 Head Start,123 the Job Corps,124 and the Community 
Action Program.125 Overall, the period from roughly 1933-1981 witnessed the 
formation of the modern welfare state. During this time, there was an increasing 
appreciation for the role of the federal government as an agent to promote and 
protect the public interest. 
C. From New Property to New Nuisance: The Return of Individual Rights 
Two influential scholars of the twentieth centuryCharles Reich and 
Richard Epsteinused the language of individual rights in framing 
impassioned pleas for social reform. Both feared the power of the majority to 
impose its will upon lone individuals. But beyond the common call for increased 
rights, their philosophies diverged. Following on the heels of the New Deal and 
roughly contemporaneous with the Great Society era, Reichs scholarship on the 
new property emphasized the communitys responsibility to ensure that all its 
members enjoyed at least the basic necessities of life.126 Epsteins writings, in 
contrast, mark an historical shift from the philosophy of communitarianism to that 
of individualism.127 His workwhich resonated with the Reagan eras antipathy 
toward governmental regulation128formed the intellectual blueprint for the 
modern property rights movement.129 Epsteins views influenced the Supreme 
Court, most notably in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,130where the 
Court limited the permissible scope of uncompensated government regulation in 
certain cases to a seemingly narrow new nuisance defense.131 
                                                                                                                                
120 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
121 See Medicare Act, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.).  
122 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (Title XIX of the Social Security Act).  
123 42 U.S.C. § 9831 et seq. 
124 42 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, establishing inter alia, the Job 
Corps). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (repealed by 95 Stat. 519). 
126 Reichs work is considered in infra Part III.C.1. 
127 Epsteins work is considered in infra Part III.C.2.  
128 Ronald Reagan, president from 1981-89, sought to reduce reliance upon government. See 
generally, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/rr40.html (visited Aug. 2, 2006). 
129 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
130 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
131 Lucas is considered in supra Part II. 
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1. The New Property 
 
As we move toward a welfare state, largess will be an ever more important form 
of wealth. And largess is a vital link in the relationship between the government 
and private sides of society. It is necessary, then, that largess begin to do the 
work of property. 
 
Charles Reich (1964) 132 
 
During the contagious optimism and idealism of the Great Society era, 
Charles Reich wrote The New Property.133 From his 1964 vantage point, Reich 
attempted to describe the emerging new society.134 He focused particularly 
upon government largesseforms of wealth dispensed by the government to its 
citizens, including income, benefits, jobs, occupational licenses, franchises, 
contracts, subsidies, and services.135 Reich observed that these new government 
benefits were steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealthforms 
which are held as private property.136 But Reich worried that these new benefits 
failed to incorporate sufficient safeguards for their recipients. Instead, he feared, 
the government had broad discretion to withdraw these intangible rights at any 
time.137 Reich accepted that the new public interest state was part of a great 
and necessary movement for reform.138 He saw the revised social contract as a 
government promise to protect its citizens from the extremes of economic 
dislocation.139 And he acknowledged that there was no turning back.140 Overall, 
                                                
132 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778 (1964). See also Charles A. Reich, 
Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle Americans and the Poor 
(hereinafter, The New Economic Order), 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 817 (1996) (asserting that in a 
centrally managed economy, such as we have today, the due process clause gives every person in 
America a constitutional right to minimum subsistence and housing, to child care, education, 
employment, health insurance, retirement, and to a clean and healthy natural environment). 
133 Reich, The New Property, supra at 733. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 734-37. 
136 Id. at 733. 
137 Id. at 738. Reich noted that wealth that flows from the government is held by its recipients 
conditionally, subject to confiscation in the interest of the paramount state, a result that 
resembles the philosophy of feudal tenure. Id. at 768-69. 
138 Id. at 771. 
139 Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 817. 
140 Reich wrote, There can be no retreat from the public interest state. It is the inevitable 
outgrowth of an interdependent world. An effort to return to an earlier economic order would 
merely transfer power to giant private governments which would rule not in the public interest, but 
in their own interest. Reich, The New Property, supra note 132, at 778. 
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however, Reich asserted that the public interest had been grossly 
misinterpreted, thereby distorting the high purposes of the reforms of the New 
Deal and the New Society.141 
 
To compensate for the insecurity of benefits provided by the emerging 
welfare state, Reich proposed a solution cloaked in the language of rights and 
property. He argued not for the abolition of government welfare programs, but 
instead that individual entitlements under such programs should receive the 
protections enjoyed by private property.142 In sum, he argued that the conception 
of government benefits should move from largess to right. Reich more fully 
developed his views in three subsequent articles: Beyond the New Property: An 
Ecological View of Due Process (1990);143 The Liberty Impact of the New 
Property (1990);144 and Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal 
of Middle Americans and the Poor (1996).145 
 
As an initial matter, there may appear to be an alignment of interests 
between Reich and the modern-day property rights movement. From this 
perspective, The New Property might be a precursor to the writings of Epstein and 
other property rights advocates.146 At least three facets of Reichs writing, 
however, belie this preliminary impression. First, Reich tempered his concern for 
private property with a firm underpinning of instrumentalism. He wasfirst and 
foremosta champion of societys weakest and most vulnerable members, 
deploring the inequalities that he observed throughout his life. Over twenty-five 
years after the publication of The New Property, Reich asserted passionately: 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
141 Id. at 777. 
142 In 1996, Reich summarized the thesis of The New Property this way:  
As a result of reform efforts, increased constitutional powers were assumed by 
the government in return for societal responsibility to the individuals who gave 
up their economic independence in recognition of the greater efficiency of large 
organizations. The New Property argued that, if the new social contract was to 
be respected, welfare state protections and benefits for the middle class and the 
poor must be treated as entitlementsa substitute for old forms of property.  
Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 817. 
143 Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process (hereinafter, 
An Ecological View), 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731 (1990). 
144 Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property (hereinafter, The Liberty Impact), 31 
WM. & MARY L. REV. at 295 (1990). 
145 Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 817. 
146 See supra notes. 
 
 
28
It is one thing to accept inequality as part of our system, where 
some enjoy luxury while other lives are comparatively spartan. But 
what we see today is not the kind of inequality that provides 
incentive to healthy ambition; it is misery that fills the rest of us 
with fear and horror. This is too great a punishment for 
fecklessness or failure; it falls below the line of what any society 
can morally tolerate.147 
 
A persistent critic of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few,148 Reich 
claimed, ownership has allowed corporations to become empires, sometimes 
under the control of a single individual. Far from favoring the autonomous rights 
advanced by Epstein, Reich concluded that as a result of economic disparity, 
property law has been turned upside down. 149  
 
As a second line of departure from modern property rights advocates, 
Reichs writings are communitarian rather than individualistic in tone, 
emphasizing responsibility as well as rights. He identified as fundamental the 
question of how much responsibility . . . the community [should] take for the 
protection of the individual.150 In arguing for a broad duty, Reich exclaimed, 
there is something grotesquely wrong with a society that denies individual life 
support while spending billions of dollars of public money on anything else. That 
even one person should be without shelter while the communitys wealth is spent 
elsewhere is an abomination.151 In emphasizing responsibility as well as right, he 
                                                
147 Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 143, at 743. 
148 Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 823 (observing, [a]s a result of the denial 
of true ownership to individuals, corporations, along with a small group of very rich individuals, 
have become the principal owners of the nations wealth). 
149 Id. at 819. In The New Property, Reich observed that previous reforms, 
took away some of the power of the corporations and transferred it to 
government. In this transfer there was much good, for power was made 
responsive to the majority rather than to the arbitrary and selfish few. But the 
reform did not restore the individual to his domain. What the corporation had 
taken from him, the reform simply handed on to government. . . . Today it is the 
combined power of government and the corporations that presses against the 
individual. 
Reich, The New Property, supra note 132, at 773. Reich was quick to add that his view was not 
intended as anti-institutional, but was simply a call to recognize that the organizational 
revolution of the present time has its costs in individual liberty and security that now demand 
protection. Reich, The Liberty Impact, supra note 144, at 304. 
150 Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 143, at 731, 733 (suggesting the community should 
make individual security an absolute, constitutional right which must be honored ahead of the 
other goals of society). 
151 Id. at 739. 
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reasoned that society tolerates continued suffering in its midst because we do not 
feel responsible ourselves, and we do not feel that society is responsible. . . . It is 
the premise of non-responsibility that allows us to look the other way.152 
 
Finally, in sharp relief from the distaste for environmental regulation 
expressed by Epstein and his followers, Reich found a critical relationship 
between environmental and social wellbeing, believing that the idea of the 
individuals property is ecological. . . . Human life developed in organic 
communities . . . [in which] the individual is not threatened by starvation or lack 
of shelter unless the entire community is similarly threatened. . . . 153 Reich 
explained, The crisis of the natural environment and the crisis of the unprotected 
individual are similar. . . . The lakes, trees, and wildlife dying from acid rain and 
the human beings dying on our city streets are alike in that they are victims of an 
economic system out of control in that it denies and displaces its costs.154 
   
The impact of The New Property has been profound, although Reich 
himself was pessimistic that his larger message had been received. Writing thirty 
years after publication of The New Property, Reich worried, [t]he concept of new 
property for the great mass of working Americans has been rejected, and with it 
the promise of secure economic citizenship.155 In contrast to Reichs pessimism, 
supporters and critics alike have cited to Reichs work thousands of times, bearing 
testimony to the enduring legacy of his work, and to its influence upon the way 
scholars and jurists think about property.156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
152 Id. at 744 (suggesting that corrective action, and not blame, is necessary when unacceptable 
conditions were created by many different public and private bodies, if not by all of us). 
153 Id. at 737. 
154 Id. at 734. 
155 Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 819 (bemoaning, [t]hirty years later, it is 
clear that the law has failed to protect the economic citizenship of individuals. After a few 
important but tentative steps, including Goldberg v. Kelly, the law has turned against the whole 
concept of individual economic rights). Id., citing to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.8 
(1970) (requiring pretermination evidentiary hearing prior to the discontinuance of public 
assistance payments to welfare recipients, and citing with approval to the writings of Reich). 
156 See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 15, at 124-25 (asserting that rights became a fad, critically 
noting that Reich got his wish as expressed in The New Property). 
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2. The New Nuisance 
 
[G]reed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed 
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, 
in all of its forms: greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge has marked the 
upward surge of mankind. . . .  
 
Wall Street (1987)157 
 
By the 1980s, society had cast off the previous generations worrisome 
idealism, replacing it with the pragmatic pursuit of wealth and security. Like the 
powerful industrialists a century earlier, corporate executives of the period were 
tempted by opportunities to promote their individual wellbeing at the expense of 
the community welfare, a temptation that the popular culture satirized in films 
such as Wall Street.158 During this era, Ronald Reagan served as president159 and 
Richard Epstein advanced his property rights philosophy.160 Against this historical 
backdrop, the Supreme Court issued its 1992 opinion, Lucas v. S. Carolina 
Coastal Council.161 In contrast to Reichs concern for the rights of societys 
weakest members, the property reforms championed by Reich (and echoed in 
Lucas) would cast a wider net, strengthening the rights of rich and poor alike.162  
D. From Lucas to Lingle: The Return of Community Safeguards?  
After Lucas, the Supreme Court decided six additional regulatory takings 
cases163 before the era of the Rehnquist Court came to a close in 2005.164 
                                                
157 In the film Wall Street, Gordon Gekko, a ruthless corporate raider played by Michael Douglas, 
advised a young Wall Street stockbroker how to achieve success in the corporate world of the 
1980s. See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes (visited July 30, 2006). 
158 See supra note 157 (presenting a parody of the worst excesses committed in the 1980s spirit of 
aggressive individualism). 
159 See supra note. 
160 See supra notes. 
161 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
162 See, e.g., infra notes 82-85 (discussing application of Epsteinian philosophy to wealthy land 
developer). 
163 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005); Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Authority (TRPA), 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
164 Following the death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, John G. Roberts, Jr. was appointed 
the 17th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on September 29, 2005. See Members of the Supreme 
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Arguably, the cases indicate a renewed concern for the public interest served by 
land use and other environmental regulations, thereby restoring balance between 
individual rights and community welfare.165  
 
Two of the six post-Lucas cases are particularly instructive. In Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA),166 six 
members of the Court refused to hold that a total ban on development for thirty-
two monthsduring which the community finalized its comprehensive land use 
planrequired compensation as a total taking under Lucas.167 Instead, the 
Court insisted that the delay suffered by the landowners was but one factor to be 
measured against the competing public interest: 
 
Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is 
as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the 
straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is 
characterized by essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries . . . 
designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the 
relevant circumstances.168  
 
This renewed focus upon the public interest was reinforced just three years later, 
in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Incorporated.169 In that case, a unanimous Supreme 
Court reversed course, rejecting its prior statement that government regulators 
bear the burden of demonstrating that certain land use regulations substantially 
advance legitimate state interests.170 In explicitly uncoupling the analytical 
framework of regulatory takings from that of substantive due process,171 the Court 
relieved the government of a heightened burden of proof, and once again restored 
                                                                                                                                
Court of the United States. On January 31, 2006, Samuel A. Alito, Jr. assumed the associate 
justice position vacated by the retiring Justice Sandra Day OConnor. Id.  
165 See generally, Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of 
the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (2006).  
166 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
167 Id. (Stevens, J., joined by OConnor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.J.) 
168 Id. at 1478. See also Lazarus, supra note, at 819 (concluding that after TRPA, Lucass 
precedential reach became almost a nullity). 
169 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
170 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.255 (1980) (imposing requirement in context of 
development exaction), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
171 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (explaining that the substantially advances [test] . . . prescribes an 
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings test, and . . . it has no proper place in our 
takings jurisprudence). 
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balance to the Penn Central analysis. The Court acknowledged that its 
substantially advance detour had been an analytical mistake, and conceded that 
it must eat crow to correct its error.172  
 
After an initial period of flux, a similar pattern of regulatory tolerance 
emerged from the post-Lucas decisions of the Federal Circuit.173 In the immediate 
aftermath of Lucas, the Federal Circuit interpreted Lucas as signaling a sea 
change favorable to the property rights of landowners. Under this view, the 
governments defense in all regulatory takings casesspilling beyond the narrow 
universe of Lucas total-takings caseswas restricted to background principles of 
nuisance and property law. As a result, Penn Centrals wide-ranging balancing of 
regulatory benefits and burdens was replaced with a cramped sphere of acceptable 
government action. For example, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower courts finding that the prohibition of 
construction in a wetland constituted a regulatory taking.174 The court explained, 
  
The effect, then, of Lucas was to dramatically change the third 
criterion [of the Penn Central analysis], from one in which courts . 
. . were called upon to . . . balanc[e] private property rights against 
state regulatory policy, to one in which state property law, 
incorporating common law nuisance doctrine, controls. This sea 
change removed from regulatory takings the vagaries of the 
balancing process. . . . It substituted instead a referent familiar to 
property lawyers everywhere. . . .175 
 
The Federal Circuits aggressive interpretation of property rights under Lucas 
endured for a decade. In 2004, however, the Circuit announced its return to the 
pre-Lucas evaluation of the character of the Government actions factor [of Penn 
Central].176 Thereafter, the court noted, it would adopt a gestalt approach, 
evaluating both the purpose and desired effect of governmental regulation.177 As a 
                                                
172 Official Oral Argument Transcript, at 21, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, No. 04-163 (Feb. 22, 2005) 
(remarks of Justice Scalia). 
173 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (providing United States Court of Federal Claims exclusive 
jurisdiction in cases involving over $10,000, and sharing concurrent jurisdiction with the federal 
district course for regulatory takings claims not exceeding $10,000). 
174 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogation recognized 
by Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
175 Id. at 1179. See also Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 231 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(characterizing the Loveladies Harbor analysis as a Penn Central test with a Lucas gloss). 
176 Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
177 Id. at 1370. See also Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(noting that courts should consider the purpose and importance of the public interest underlying a 
regulatory imposition). 
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result, the Federal Circuit removed its judicial thumb from the individual rights 
side of the individual-community balancing scale. 
IV. WHATS NEW ABOUT NUISANCE? THE AFTERMATH OF LUCAS 
The Lucas legacy represents one of the starkest recent examples of the law of 
unintended consequences. 
 
Michael C. Blumm (2005)178 
 
To the extent . . . that takings law has perceptibly shifted since the Courts 1978 
Penn Central ruling, it has arguably become more and not less difficult for 
regulatory takings plaintiffs to prevail. . . . What Scalia [through Lucas] hoped 
to serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to work more 
often as a per se no takings rule. 
 
Richard J. Lazarus (2006)179 
 
This section will trace the post-Lucas development of the law of new 
nuisance. In broad strokes, the discussion will consider the evolution of the 
antecedent inquiry contemplated by the Lucas majority,180 as well as the 
changed circumstances or new knowledge referenced by Justice Kennedys 
concurrence.181 This analysis will set the stage for Part Vs application of new 
nuisance doctrine to three specific environmental problems: wetland 
development, sprawling land use patterns, and global warming. 
 
The first draft of this section produced a workmanlike, methodical 
cataloguing of the extent to which new scientific learning has been incorporated 
into the Lucas defense. As reported by Professors Blumm and Lazarus, Lucas left 
a legacy surprisingly favorable to governmental defendants in the form of a new 
defense that proved to be categorical in nature.182 Beyond confirming that 
discovery, my subsequent work on the manuscript uncovered a second 
unexpected developmentLucas may have contributed to a spillover effect, 
reinvigorating the use of nuisance in its traditional offensive tort posture, outside 
the context of a defense to regulatory takings claims.183 That is, as new ecological 
                                                
178 Michael C. Blumm, Lucass Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as 
Categorical Takings Defense, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005).  
179 Lazarus, supra note 165, at 823-24. 
180 See supra note and accompanying text. 
181 See supra note and accompanying text. 
182 See infra note and accompanying text. 
183 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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and other learning began to connect the dots between cause and effect, more 
aggressive nuisance claims became viable.184  
 
Third, yet another analytical surprise took shape, this time in the factual 
context of climate change. As California initiated global warming legislation, 
property rights advocates were largely silent. The regulatory takings challenges 
that I had anticipated did not materialize.185 Instead, many in the regulated 
community acquiesced, with some even calling for broad federal regulation. Can 
this reaction be attributed, at least in part, to Lucas? The next section considers 
this possibility. In addition, it describes in more detail the progression of new 
nuisance law from Lucas defense, to common law offense, and beyond to catalyst 
for legislative action. 
A. The New Posture: From Defense, to Offense, to Legislative Catalyst 
 
1. New Nuisance as Defense 
 
Lucas made clear that the new nuisance rule functions as an affirmative 
defense to governmental liability in cases where regulation deprives property of 
all economically beneficial use. Procedurally, the Court explained, the defense 
should be considered as part of an antecedent inquiry into the nature of the 
owners estate, during which the government bears the burden of show[ing] that 
the proscribed use interests were not part of [the landowners] title to begin 
with.186 In bearing its burden, the government may go beyond traditional public 
and private nuisance, relying also upon background principles of the States law 
of property.187 Concurring Justice Kennedy emphasized that in his view the 
defense should be construed broadly, arguing that the common law of nuisance 
is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and 
interdependent society.188 Following this view, lower courts have applied a wide 
                                                
184 See infra Part IV.B. 
185 The reaction, of course, was not uniform. For a nuanced discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3. 
186 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added). 
187 Id. at 1029. 
188 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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variety of takings defenses embedded in state nuisance and property law,189 both 
common law and statutory.190 
 
As the lower courts have worked through the ramifications of the Lucas 
defense, at least two important developments have followed. First, as Professor 
Blumm has noted, in some cases Lucass landowner-friendly categorical rule has 
given way to a regulator-friendly categorical defense: 
 
[R]ather than heralding in a new era of landowner compensation or 
government deregulation, Lucas instead spawned a surprising rise 
of categorical defenses to takings claims in which governments can 
defeat compensation suits without case-specific inquiries into the 
economic effects and public purposes of regulations. Lucas 
accomplished this by establishing the prerequisite that a claimant 
must first demonstrate that its property interest was unrestrained by 
prior restrictions.191 
 
The governments defense becomes categorical primarily in cases where it rests 
upon background principles of property (such as the public trust doctrine, the 
natural use doctrine, the navigational servitude, customary rights, water law 
principles, the wildlife trust, and Indian treaty rights), rather than upon principles 
of nuisance.192 
 
Second, although Lucas contemplates an antecedent inquiry into the 
landowners property interest only in the case of total takings,193 lower courts 
                                                
189 See Blumm, supra note 178, at 367 (concluding that over the past twelve years, nearly a dozen 
distinct categories of Lucas-inspired threshold defenses have been proposed to and subsequently 
employed by lower courts to reject takings claims). Blumm believes this regulation-friendly trend 
is likely to continue. Id. at 364-65 (Because many [Lucas defenses are a product of state law, it 
does not seem likely that the Supreme Court . . . could arrest this proliferation, even if it wanted to 
do so.).  
190 Id. at 354-59 (observing that [a]lthough Justice Scalias Lucas majority opinion cautioned 
against employing legislatively decreed background principles, many post-Lucas courts have sided 
with Justice Kennedys Lucas concurrence to hold that state and federal statutes may function as a 
threshold bar to takings challenges). 
191 Id. at 322. 
192 Id. at 334 n. 75 and 341-54 (noting that nuisance remains inherently a balancing test). 
193 As Lucas explained: 
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail . . . analysis of, 
among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or 
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, . . , the 
social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in 
question, . . . and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided 
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have begun to put landowner property interests under the microscope in all 
takings cases.194 As a result, the principle question in a traditional takings 
analysisdid the government go too far?195has been postponed until after 
consideration of the antecedent question, did the landowner go too far?196 In 
practical terms, this has leveled the playing field between public and private 
interests. It might also defuse the modern one-sided rhetoric of rights that portrays 
landowners as the victims of governmental regulators, without regard for 
important community values that government regulations may protect.197 As a 
result of this preliminary opportunity to state their case, regulators can now defeat 
takings liability during the early stages of litigation by demonstrating that the 
landowner never had the unfettered right to engage in the regulated activity. In 
such cases, courts need not address the additional Penn Central factors that may 
favor landowners, including the degree of interference with reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations, and the economic impact of the challenged 
regulation.198 
 
2. New Nuisance as Offense 
 
By focusing attention upon the traditional doctrine of nuisance, Lucas 
breathed new life into an old body of law, turning it into an important 
governmental defense. Moreover, this attention to defensive nuisance may have 
triggered a renewed appreciation of the doctrines usefulness in its more common 
offensive posture.199 It is impossible to demonstrate a precise cause-and-effect 
relationship between Lucas and subsequent affirmative nuisance actions. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a number of novel nuisance lawsuits were filed 
in the fifteen years following Lucas. Among these are public nuisance claims filed 
against nontraditional defendantsthe manufacturers of products such as guns, 
                                                                                                                                
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private 
landowners) alike. . . . 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32 
194 See Blumm, supra note 178, at 322, 326 (asserting that [i]n effect, the Lucas decision 
fundamentally revised all takings analysis by making the nature of the landowners property rights 
a threshold issue in every takings case). 
195 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
196 See supra note. 
197 See supra Part I. 
198 See supra note and accompanying text. 
199 See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 
91 (1998) (asserting that the law of regulatory takings has restored the law of nuisance to the 
agenda of regulators, legislators, and planners). But see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public 
Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOL. L.Q. 755 (2001).  
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lead paint, tobacco,200 and automobiles.201 Post-Lucas lawsuits have also alleged 
nontraditional harms, such as the loss of a subsistence fishing lifestyle caused by 
an Alaskan oil spill,202 or warming of the global climate caused by the emission of 
carbon dioxide by electrical utilities and automobiles.203 
 
3.  New Nuisance as Legislative Catalyst 
 
The new interest in both defensive and offensive nuisanceas triggered 
by Lucasmay serve to clarify the relationship between developmental activities 
and negative environmental consequences. As courts connect the dots between 
cause and effect, actors may become more cognizant of their potential liability for 
actions that harm wetlands, disrupt natural lands, and release greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere. As legal precedent and new learning evolveand as liability 
becomes more likelythe industry decision making process will undoubtedly 
respond.  
 
At some undefined tipping point, it may become more cost effective for 
the regulated community to shape, rather than resist, legislation.204 As a result, 
industry may find it more favorable to engage in the development of 
comprehensive, federal legislation than to initiate numerous, individual takings 
lawsuits. Moreover, some entrepreneurial actors may come to embrace federal 
legislation as a consistent baseline that creates a potentially profitable market for 
technological innovation. Those who adapt first may find lucrative opportunities 
to develop compliance tools that others may adopt. 
                                                
200 See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational 
Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006).  
201 See infra Part V.C. 
202 See Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs 
claim for failure to demonstrate that they suffered a special injury different in kind, rather than 
degree, from all citizens of Alaska). 
203 See infra Part V.C. 
204 Dean Scott, Boucher Tells Coal Industry Bill is Coming; Pelosi, Dingell End Dispute Over 
Select Panel, 38 Envt Reporter 302, Feb. 9, 2007 (describing warning by head of House of 
Representatives energy subcommittee to coal industry that federal legislation limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions is inevitable and that it would be better off working with Congress on a proposal 
than risk facing a more stringent bill from the next administration). 
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B. The New Learning: Environmental Connectivity 
[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously 
permissible no longer so.  
Justice Kennedy205 
 
New appreciation of the significance of endangered species; the importance of 
wetlands; and the vulnerability of coastal lands shapes our evolving 
understandings of property rights. 
 
Justice Stevens206 
 
The contemporary emphasis on rights rather than responsibility has 
skewed the current perception of the natural world. In particular, community 
efforts to protect the environment have been construed as taking something 
away from regulated actors, but there has been little serious consideration of 
whether individual development activities may also take something away from 
the community. As science learns more about the ecological consequences of 
human development activity, it becomes apparent that just as public interest 
regulation may adversely impact certain developers, so also may those developers 
have adverse impacts upon their neighbors. The doctrine of regulatory takings has 
been slow to recognize this two-way relationship. In theory, traditional takings 
law has long recognized a nuisance exception under which landowners are not 
entitled to compensation when they are precluded from using their land to create a 
nuisance.207 In actual practice, however, some modern courts have been reluctant 
to recognize that common development activities may actually harm the 
community in a nuisance-like fashion.208  
 
                                                
205 Lucas, 505 U.S. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Reich, An Ecological View,  supra note 
143, at 744 (concluding that [t]he environmental principle should warn us that, because all life is 
interconnected, none of us can escape the consequences of suffering in our midst). 
206 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
207 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (requiring no compensation where law 
prohibited manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) 
(requiring no compensation where ordinance prohibited operation of a brick yard within city 
limits); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (requiring no compensation where government 
ordered destruction of diseased cedar trees to protect neighboring orchards); Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (requiring no compensation where law impeded quarry operation 
in residential area).  
208 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 (reasoning that the distinction between harm-preventing 
[without compensation] and benefit-conferring [requiring compensation] regulation is often in 
the eye of the beholder and concluding that it is quite possible to describe in either fashion the 
ecological, economic, and aesthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina legislature in the 
present case).  
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Modern scholarship has begun to identify the correlation between action 
and consequence. In particular, some scholars have begun to recognize what this 
article calls environmental connectivity, the relationship between the development 
of land (and the use of other natural resources) and community welfare. This body 
of work moves beyond the traditional narrative under which the government 
takes and the land developer gives (jobs and other benefits), recognizing 
instead a bilateral relationship. At least three broad theoretical aspects of this 
literature are particularly relevant to the issue of regulatory takings. 
 
First, the field of law and economics has developed the concept of 
externalities, the recognition that actions often have spillover effects not fully 
borne by the actors.209 As long as these externalities remain unidentified, actors 
are able to escape responsibility for the full consequences of their negative 
externalities, and fail to receive recognition for the full scope of their positive 
externalities. Government, therefore, must carefully identify the complete range 
of externalities flowing from a particular action before it can fashion any effective 
system of regulations, incentives, or rewards. In other words, it is a proper role of 
government to internalize externalities,210 thereby requiring actors to absorb the 
negative impacts of their actions, rather than to foist them onto the community.  
 
A second aspect of the new learning specifically applies the economic 
theory of externalities to the law of regulatory takings. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdomwhich begins with a concern for fairness to landowners
some modern scholars have emphasized fairness to communities. For example, an 
article in the Yale Law Journal entitled Givings211 examines the positive 
externalities of numerous government programs, ranging from zoning changes 
beneficial to certain property owners, to relaxation of environmental regulations, 
to the granting of licenses.212 Restating traditional takings doctrine from the 
perspective of the community, the authors argue,  
 
[I]t is inequitable to bestow a benefit upon some people that, in all 
fairness and justice, should be given to the public as a whole. In a 
giving, a small group is able to force the public as a whole to 
subsidize the groups preferential treatment. For example, when 
the state permits logging companies to chop down trees in national 
                                                
209 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
210 See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist 
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L.R. 653, 655 (2006). 
211 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001). 
212 Id. at 549. 
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forests for lumber, it is forcing the public as a whole to surrender 
natural resources for the private profit of the logging companies.213 
 
Asserting that takings and givings are so inextricably related that one cannot 
have a coherent takings jurisprudence without an attendant giving 
jurisprudence,214 the authors construct an elaborate model for identifying, 
assessing, and collecting fair charges for givings.215 As an alternative method to 
promote an evenhanded application of the takings doctrine, some scholars use the 
language of rights, recognizing the rights of communities (as receptors), as well 
as the rights of property owners (as generators). In the context of pollution, these 
scholars argue that the law should focus upon the property rights of receptors of 
pollutants, rather than the generators of pollution.216 They conclude that the 
present system effectively subsidize[s] polluters by permitting then to deposit 
waste into public and private property and to use the population as test subjects 
while unconstitutionally taking their property rights.217  
 
A third strand of modern learning studies and quantifies the numerous 
benefits produced by a healthy ecosystem. Stanford conservation biologist 
Gretchen Daily and others conducted pioneering research in ecosystem 
services,218 observing that environments of interacting plants, animals, and 
microbes . . . can be seen as capital assets, supplying human beings with a stream 
of services that sustain and enhance our lives.219 Their work seeks to measure, 
capture, and protect the newly discovered values before they are lost.220 
                                                
213 Id. at 554. Compare Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the 
takings clause prevents the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole). 
214 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 552. 
215 Id. at 604-09. 
216 Robert H. Cutting and Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box: Property Rights as a 
Key to Environmental Protection, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 55 (2005).  
217 Id. See also Joseph L. Sax, Essay: Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 513 (2005); Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the 
Privatization of Water, 1 WEST-N.W. J. ENVTL L. & POLY 13 (1994). 
218 See NATURES SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. 
Daily ed., 1997); GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: 
THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE (2002). See also Salzman et al., Protecting 
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); Robert L. 
Fischman, The EPAs NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 497 (2001); 
J.B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case 
Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365 (2001).  
219 DAILY & ELLISON, supra, at 5.   
220 Id. at 5. 
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Ecosystem services can provide a broad range of benefits to society, often quite 
unexpected. For example, the 2005 book Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our 
Children From Nature-Deficit Disorder argues that the modern alienation from 
naturetermed nature deficit disorderdamages children, and that exposure to 
nature could provide a therapy for depression, obesity, and attention-deficit 
disorder.221 A related body of work studies natural capital, defined as the stock 
that yields the flow of natural resourcesthe population of fish in the ocean that 
regenerates the flow of caught fish that go to market; the standing forest that 
regenerates the flow of cut timber. . . .222 Natural capital yields both natural 
resources and natural services.223 Like traditional forms of capital, these scholars 
argue, natural capital should be maintained intact.224 Still other scholars focus on 
reform of cost-benefit analysis. They argue that ecosystem services and natural 
capital are consistently undervalued in cost-benefit analyses because such assets 
are external to traditional economic markets.225 Overall, the literature on 
externalities, givings, ecosystem services, and related disciplines provides fertile 
support for the modern evolution of nuisance doctrine, as stimulated by Lucas. 
V. THE NEW NUISANCE APPLIED: CONNECTING THE DOTS 
This section applies the new nuisance doctrine to three difficult 
environmental problemswetland development, sprawling land use patterns, and 
global warming. Each problem is exacerbated, in part, when landowners, 
developers, and ordinary citizens are allowed to harm environmental resources 
without bearing (or perhaps even knowing) the full economic, environmental, and 
social costs of their actions. As considered below, new nuisance law may be an 
appropriate vehicle to allocate these environmental costs, shifting responsibility 
back to the actors whose enterprises inflict nuisance-like harms upon society.  
 
The discussion begins with a survey of the evolving new knowledge of the 
relationship between environmental destruction and public harm. It then traces 
three aspects of the post-Lucas evolution of the law: 1) the extent to which 
communities have successfully asserted the Lucas affirmative defense to avoid 
                                                
221 RICHARD LOUV, LAST CHILD IN THE WOODS: SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM NATURE DEFICIT 
DISORDER (2005). See also David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 
28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2004); JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO 
FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005). 
222 HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH , at 80 (1996).  
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 76. 
225 See LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, 
2002). 
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takings liability for wetland, land use, and global warming regulation; 2) the 
extent to which offensive public nuisance lawsuits have succeeded when alleging 
environmental harms; and 3) the extent to which the new learning has induced the 
regulated community to accept responsibility for its actions, paving the way for 
the passage of new environmental legislation likely to escape facial challenge 
under the regulatory takings doctrine. 
A.  Wetland Destruction as New Nuisance 
1.  The New Learning on Wetlands 
 
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, and not 
picturesque. But as the people became more sophisticated, an appreciation was 
acquired that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the 
balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and 
streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of the ecological creation 
and now, even to the uninitiated, possess their own beauty in nature. 
 
Just v. Marinette County (1972)226 
Modern studies have revealed that wetlands perform a vast range of 
ecosystem services for the community. The Environmental Protection Agency has 
identified at least five such functions;227 and studies have begun to quantify the 
economic value of the services performed.228 First, wetlands improve water 
quality by processing, decomposing, and trapping inorganic nutrients, organic 
wastes, and suspended solids that would otherwise pollute surface waters.229 Site-
specific studies have valued this service in excess of one million dollars for 
individual communities.230 Second, wetlands provide protection against floods, 
                                                
226 201 N.W. 2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972). 
227 See United States Envtl Protection Agency, Functions and Values of Wetlands (hereinafter, 
EPA, Functions and Values) (EPA 843-F-01-002c, September 2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/fun_val.pdf (visited July 18, 2006). 
228 See, e.g., Edward B. Berbier et al., Economic Valuation of Wetlands: A Guide for Policy 
Makers and Planners (Ramsar Convention Bureau 1997), available at www.ramsar.org/lib 
(visited July 18, 2006)); North Carolina State University, Water Quality Group, Wetland 
Functions and Values, available at http://h2osparc.wq.ncsu.edu/info/wetlands/funval.html (visited 
July 18, 2006); R.P. Novitzki et al., Restoration, Creation, and Recovery of Wetlands: Wetland 
Functions, Values, and Assessment, United States Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 2425, 
available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/functions.html (visited July 18, 2006). 
229 See William S. Sipple, United States EPA Office of Water, Wetland Functions and Values, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/wetlands/index.htm (visited July 18, 2006). 
230 Two examples utilized by the EPA include the Congaree Bottomland Hardwood Swamp of 
South Carolina (removing a quantity of pollutants that would be equivalent to that removed 
annually by a $5 million waste water treatment plant according to a 1990 study) and a 2500 acre 
wetland in Georgia (saving one million dollars annually in pollution abatement costs). Id. at 
Section 5. Wetlands improve the flow (or hydrology) of water, as well as its quality. For example, 
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hurricanes, and shoreline erosion by storing excess waters and releasing them 
slowly.231 A Minnesota study found that the draining of five thousand wetland 
acres destroyed natural flood control valued at $1.5 million annually.232 Even 
more striking, a Mississippi River basin study found that wetland destruction and 
levee construction had reduced the basins natural storage capacity from sixty 
days of floodwater to twelve days of floodwater.233 Third, wetlands provide 
habitat for fish, wildlife, and plants, making them some of the most biologically 
productive natural ecosystems in the world, comparable to tropical rain forests 
and coral reefs . . . .234 This habitat supports a commercial and recreational 
fishing industry valued at approximately seventy-nine billion dollars annually.235 
Fourth, wetlands help to maintain favorable atmospheric conditions by storing 
carbon in peat, thus helping to control global warming. When drained or filled, 
wetlands release the carbon as carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas that affects the 
earths climate.236 Finally, wetlands provide aesthetic, recreational, and 
educational opportunities. Studies estimate that Americans spend more than fifty-
nine billion dollars annually in connection with wetland hunting, fishing, 
birdwatching, and wildlife photography.237 
                                                                                                                                
[o]ne calculation for a 5-acre Florida cypress swamp recharging groundwater was that, if 80 
percent of swamp was drained, available ground water would be reduced by an estimated 45 
percent. Id.  
231 Id. at Section 6.  
232 Id. The EPA estimates that a single wetland acre can store up to 1.5 million gallons of 
floodwater. EPA, Functions and Values, supra note. Citing to the 38 deaths and billions of dollars 
of damage caused by the 1993 upper Mississippi River Basin flood, the EPA commented, 
Historically, 20 million acres of wetlands in this area had been drained or filled, mostly for 
agricultural purposes. If the wetlands had been preserved rather than drained, much property 
damage and crop loss could have been avoided. Id. 
233 Id. (concluding that in addition to their fish and wildlife values, wetlands reduce the likelihood 
of flood damage to homes, businesses, and crops in agricultural areas and results in less 
monetary flood damage (and related insurance costs), as well as protection of human health, 
safety, and welfare). As a related function, wetlands adjacent to open water provide erosion 
protection and buffer the storm surges from hurricanes and tropical storms by dissipating wave 
energy before it impacts roads, houses, and other man-made structures. Id. 
234 EPA, Functions and Values, supra note 229. 
235 Id. (citing to 1997 data from the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermens Associations). 
236 Sipple, supra note 229, at Section 2. 
237 Id.  
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2.  Defending Wetland Regulations 
Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that 
the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common 
law of nuisance might otherwise permit. 
 
Justice Kennedy (1992)238 
 
a. Wetland destruction as categorical defense: In the post-Lucas era, a 
number of state and federal courts have held that governmental efforts to protect 
wetlands do not constitute regulatory takings because wetland destruction 
constitutes a nuisance. Often, these courts apply the new nuisance defense of 
Lucas, in the context of a Penn Central balancing analysis.239 The state courts of 
Massachusetts,240 Pennsylvania241 and Rhode Island242 have based their holdings 
                                                
238 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
239 See Blumm, supra note 178, at 327 (discussing background principles as categorical takings 
defense) and 336 (arguing that a nuisance defense is particularly appropriate in the case of 
wetlands protection). 
240 See Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Blair, 2000 WL 875903 (Mass. Super. 2000) 
(unreported decision) (rejecting takings challenge to state statute prohibiting the alteration of land 
within 200 feet of surface waters within protected watersheds supplying public drinking water), 
affirmed as modified, Commonwealth v. Blair, 805 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. 2004). The trial 
court held: 
The rights of a property owner to utilize lakefront property comes with 
significant limitations when the regulatory concern is for the health and welfare 
of society. Conduct affecting a public resource, such as public water supplies, 
that could be actionable at common law . . . under a public nuisance theory, may 
be aptly regulated, or at minimum, be regulated with a decreased risk of having 
the regulation adjudicated an unconstitutional taking. . . . The character of the 
government action here, therefore, is much akin to prohibiting acts which may 
have been prohibited, at least in part, at common law prior to the enactment of 
the [challenged statute] in 1992. 
Id. at *7. The appellate court did not disturb this holding in its modified affirmance. See also Gove 
v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, 831 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2005) (rejecting takings 
challenge to denial of permit to build single-family house on undeveloped land within coastal 
conservancy district). The trial court had found that the subject property was located within a flood 
plain, and that construction of the proposed house would pose a danger to neighboring 
landowners. Gove, 831 N.E. 2d at 875. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded, [r]easonable 
government action mitigating such harm, at the very least when it does not involve a total 
regulatory taking or a physical invasion, typically does not require compensation. Id. 
241 See Machipongo Land and Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751 
(Pa. 2002) (rejecting takings challenge to state regulation designating particular watershed as 
unsuitable for mining). Independent of evidence that the proposed mining operation would destroy 
a trout population and adversely impact water supply, the Court stated, We have explained that 
we believe that the public has a sufficient interest in clean streams alone regardless of any 
specific use thereof . . . [to warrant] injunctive relief. Id. at 774, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d, 871, 882 (Pa. 1974). 
 
 
45
on explicit findings that the destruction of wetlands or other aquatic resources 
constitutes a public nuisance.  
 
Of particular interest to government regulators is the final resolution of the 
decades-long Palazzolo litigation.243 In 1985, a Rhode Island landowner sought 
permission to fill and develop approximately eighteen acres of coastal salt 
marsh.244 The relevant state agency denied permission pursuant to state 
regulation.245 The landowner brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging 
that denial of his application constituted a regulatory taking. Ultimately, the case 
was heard by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the claim was ripe 
for review, and that the landowners acquisition of title after the effective date of 
the states wetland regulation was not an automatic bar to the takings claim.246 
Finding that the challenged regulation had not deprived the petitioner of all 
economically beneficial use of his property, the Court remanded for a resolution 
of the takings claim under the Penn Central test.247 In an earlier phase of the 
litigation, the Rhode Island trial court had found that the contemplated wetland 
development would constitute a public nuisance.248 Eight years later, on remand 
from the United States Supreme Court, the trial court again found that the 
proposed wetland development would be a public nuisance.249 The court 
concluded that, without more, nuisance would serve as a preclusive defense to 
the landowners takings claims:250  
 
                                                                                                                                
242 See infra notes. See also Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 
268-69 (R.I. 1981) (in pre-Lucas decision, holding that there is no property right to fill wetlands 
because it would impair public resources). 
243 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (Palazzolo I) (finding 1986 denial of 
application for dredge-and-fill permit for beach facility ripe for review under Penn Central 
analysis). 
244 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 2005 W.L. 1645974 (R.I. Super. 2005) (Palazzolo II) 
(unpublished decision) at *1. The state Coastal Resources Management Council had denied two 
previous permit applications submitted by Palazzolo. Id. at *1 n.2 and n.4.  
245 Under the Coastal Resources Management Plan of 1976, state regulations prohibited the filling 
of certain coastal wetlands without a special exception. 
246 Palazzolo I, 533 U.S. at 630, 632.  
247 Id. 
248 See Palazzolo II, 2005 WL 1645974 at *1 (discussing 1997 judgment of the Rhode Island 
Superior Court after 7-day bench trial). 
249 See id. at *5. 
250 Id. at *5. 
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The State has presented evidence as to various effects that the 
development will have including increasing nitrogen levels in the 
pond, both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant 
residential septic systems, and the reduced marsh area which 
actually filters and cleans runoff. This Court finds that the effects 
of increased nitrogen levels constitute a predictable (anticipatory) 
nuisance which would almost certainly result in an ecological 
disaster to the pond. . . . Nor is the proposed high density 
subdivision suitable for the salt marsh environs presented here.251 
 
In so concluding, the court was impressed by the array of ecosystem services that 
would be curtailed by the filling of coastal marshlands.252 
 
In contrast to these regulatory-friendly decisions in Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, courts in the Federal Circuit have specifically 
rejected the new nuisance defense of Lucas four times before or during 2001. 
These decisions have been based on the law of nuisance in the states of 
California,253 Florida,254 Delaware,255 and New Jersey,256 with the federal court 
                                                
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Forest, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the trial courts finding that the proposed dredging and filling of a lake bottom to 
promote residential construction would not constitute a nuisance under California law. 177 F.3d at 
1366. Nevertheless, the court rejected the takings challenge, finding that the landowner lacked 
reasonable expectations that it could develop its property as proposed. See supra note. 
254 See Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999) (finding that denial of 
§ 404 permit in connection with limestone mining operation constituted a regulatory taking). The 
court concluded, 
[P]laintiffs limestone mining operation would, like similar operations in the 
vicinity, result in only moderate, superficial pollution that does no harm, and 
would not be considered a nuisance under the relevant Florida laws. Indeed, 
plaintiffs operation was suitably located in the community and designed to help 
meet the communitys need for aggregates to be used in construction. 
Id. at 28-31. 
255 See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (2001). In Walcek, the Court of Federal Claims 
found, [t]here is no significant evidence in this case that the plaintiffs proposed use of the 
Property [filling and development of salt marsh] would formally constitute a nuisance under 
Delaware state law so that the application of the Federal wetland regulations could be viewed as 
enforcing a limitation already inherent in the Property. Id. at 270. Nevertheless, the court rejected 
the takings challenge, finding acceptable the character of the government action to protect 
wetlands. 
256 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding denial of 
§ 404 permit to constitute a regulatory taking, denying landowner of all economically beneficial 
use of New Jersey wetland property). The Federal Circuit agreed with the trial courts conclusion 
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concluding that government defendants failed to demonstrate that their challenged 
actions were designed to prevent common law nuisance under the relevant states 
law.257 Importantlydespite rejecting the argument under Lucas that wetland 
destruction is a nuisance under state lawtwo of these cases nevertheless held in 
favor of the governmental defendants under the broader Penn Central test.258   
  
b. Wetland destruction as nuisance-like balancing factor: Numerous 
other courts have found that the fill or development of wetlands may cause 
community harm, and that governments may regulate to prevent such harm 
without providing compensation to the burdened landowner.259 These courts stop 
short of describing wetland destruction as a nuisance, but has nevertheless been 
willing to reject takings challenges to regulations that preclude nuisance-like 
activities. This group includes the Federal Circuit,260 as well as the states of 
                                                                                                                                
that the federal defendant had failed to sustain its burden of proving that wetland filling 
constituted a common law nuisance. Id. at 1183. Ironically, the Federal Circuit preceded its 
holding in favor of the landowner with an impassioned paragraph extolling the value of wetlands: 
There can be no doubt today that every effort must be made individually and 
collectively to protect our natural heritage, and to pass it to future generations 
unspoiled. The destruction of ancient civilizations by human misuse of the 
environment, such as that at Ephesus, teaches the need for public policies that 
work within the natural environment, rather than attempt radically to alter it. 
 Id. at 1175. Loveladies has been discredited on other grounds. See Bass Enterprises Production 
Co., 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Mansoldo v. New Jersey, 898 A.2d 1018, 1025 (N.J. 
2006) (rejecting argument that landowners stipulation to agency determination that proposed 
development in flood plain would pose a threat to other properties during a flood constituted a 
concession that intended use of property is a nuisance under Lucas).  
257 But see John R, supra note (suggesting that in absence of controlling law in the relevant state, 
government regulators may cite to persuasive evidence that the subject activity would constitute a 
nuisance in other jurisdictions). 
258 See infra note (applying California law) and (applying Delaware law). 
259 See generally, Gina Schilmoeller, Invoking the Fifth Amendment to Preserve and Restore the 
Nations Wetlands in Coastal Louisiana, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 317 (2006); Fred P. Bosseslman, 
Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996). 
260 See Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 286 (2004) (rejecting takings challenge to 
wetland mitigation requirement imposed to Nevada property under § 404 permitting process, and 
approving character of government action especially in light of the fact that the government has a 
legitimate public welfare obligation to preserve wetlands and that the unnecessary destruction of 
wetlands violates environmental laws and is contrary to public policy); John R. Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 243 (2004) (remanding for factual development of record in 
takings challenge to administrative use of Michigan mining property during environmental 
remediation of neighboring landfill, and suggesting that the pollution of ground water may 
constitute a public or private nuisance); Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 278-79 (2000) 
(remanding for factual development of record in takings challenge to administrative order 
prohibiting drainage of wetlands, and approving character of the government action implementing 
its legitimate public welfare obligation to preserve our nations wetlands). 
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Alaska,261 Florida,262 Michigan,263 New Hampshire,264 New Jersey,265 New 
York,266 Oregon,267 South Carolina,268 Washington,269 and Wisconsin.270 
                                                                                                                                
See also Walcek, supra note (rejecting takings challenge to issuance of § 404 permit allowing only 
scaled-down version of proposed development). The Walcek court specifically rejected the 
governments nuisance defense, see supra note, but nevertheless approved the character of the 
government action. Id. at 270 (opining that the existence of the wetland regulations in question, 
as well as their application to the Property, indisputably serve an important public purposeone 
which benefits plaintiffs as members of the public at large). The court concluded, while the 
absence of a nuisance certainly cuts in favor of a finding of a taking, other circumstances in this 
case [including the importance of preserving ecologically significant areas and the general 
applicability of wetland regulations to all similarly situated property owners] ameliorate somewhat 
the impact of the [character of the government action] Penn Central factor in this regard. Id. 
See also Forest Properties, supra note (rejecting takings challenge to denial of § 404 permit to 
convert lake-bottom property into residential development). The Forest Properties court 
specifically rejected the governments nuisance defense, but nevertheless found that the developer 
lacked reasonable investment-backed expectations because at the time the developer acquired an 
option to purchase lake bottom property, the Corps guidelines governing the issuance of Section 
404 permits under the Clean Water Act had been in effect for a number of years, making clear 
that filling wetlands to construct housing on the reclaimed land was disfavored and that it was 
most unlikely that such a project would be approved. Id. at 1366-67.  
261 See R&Y, Inc. v. Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting regulatory taking challenge 
to municipal regulation prohibiting development within 100 feet of particular wetland). In 
upholding the uncompensated governmental regulation, the Court noted the ecosystem services 
provided by wetland, concluding, In preserving the valuable functions of wetlands, regulations 
like those of the [municipality of Anchorage] provide ecological and economic value to the 
landowners whose surrounding commercially-developed land is directly and especially benefited 
by the functioning of Blueberry Lake. 34 P.3d at *298. The Court was influenced, in part, by the 
comprehensive nature of wetlands regulation.  
262 See Florida v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540 (Fla. App. 2000) (rejecting regulatory taking challenge 
to denial of dredge-and-fill permit for construction of dock, boardwalk, and camping shelter on 
undeveloped 160-acre wetland). The court rejected the claim that an undeveloped wetland was 
valueless, concluding that the landowner utterly failed to demonstrate that the permit denial 
deprived him of all reasonable economic use of his land. Id. at 543 
See also Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981) (in pre-Lucas decision, 
rejecting regulatory taking challenge to denial of development permit that would have destroyed 
1800 acres of black mangrove wetland). In upholding the denial of the permit application, the 
Court noted that, under the facts of the case, wetland development would pollute the surrounding 
bays and cause a public harm. Id. at *1382-83 (stressing the magnitude of [the] proposed 
development and the sensitive nature of the surrounding lands and water to be affected by it). 
263 See K&K Construction, Inc. v. Dept of Envtl Quality, 705 N.W. 2d 365 (Mich. App. 2005) 
(reversing trial court takings award in amount of $16.5 million for denial of application for 
dredge-and-fill permit). The court concluded that that the permit denial would prevent significant 
harm to the public. Id. at 530 (citing to findings of state legislature that the loss of a wetland may 
deprive the people of the state of some or all of the . . . benefits to be derived from the wetland). 
The court was cognizant that its decision would prevent the developer from externalizing the costs 
of wetland destruction: Indeed, were we to uphold the trial court's award, we would, in effect, 
single out plaintiffs to their benefit, [by] compensating plaintiffs for the loss of value of their 
property, especially when it has a significant amount of value and development potential 
remaining. . . .  Id. at 563. See also Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W. 2d 58 (Mich. 2005), rehearing 
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Although the nuisance determination is heavily fact-specific, the cases provide 
fertile ground for extracting the factors likely to influence courts in future 
litigation. It is useful to group those factors according to the relevant prong of the 
three-part analysis established in Penn Central. 
 
                                                                                                                                
denied, 703 N.W. 2d 188 (Mich. 2005), cert. den. sub nom Goeckel v. Glass, 126 S.Ct. 1340 
(2006) (generously interpreting the public trust doctrine to extend along the Great Lakes to the 
ordinary high water mark landward of the wet sand). 
264 See Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984) (in pre-Lucas 
decision, holding that denial of permit to fill tidal marshes was not a taking because filling the 
marsh would harm the public by irreparably diminishing the marshs nutrient-producing capability 
for coastal habitats and marine fisheries). The court consciously grounded its decision in the new 
learning on wetlands, observing that [t]he dangers associated with filling wetlands have only 
recently become widely known). Id. at 292. 
265 American Dredging Co. v. Dept of Envtl Protection, 391 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J. 1978) (in pre-
Lucas decision, holding that there is no absolute right to change the essential character of land). 
In 2006, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court required the state to compensate a landowner 
who had been precluded from building two single-family homes in a river floodway, even though 
the Court acknowledged the laudatory goal of limiting flood damage and loss of life along the 
river, and that the regulation prevented a public danger to the community. Mansoldo v. State, 898 
A.2d 1018, 1020-24 (N.J. 2006). 
266 See Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E. 2d 312 (N.Y. 1997). 
267 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Ore. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1207 
(1994) (rejecting takings claim where common law doctrine of custom precluded hotel from 
erecting sea wall on dry sand area of Oregon beach). 
268 See Grant v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E. 2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (rejecting takings 
claim where landowner precluded from filling critical area tidelands under state tidelands statute). 
But see Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) (remand) 
(asserting, We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties regarding whether 
[the state] possesses the ability under the common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a 
habitable structure on his land. [The state] has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists 
by which it could restrain Lucas desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such 
common law principle.). 
269 See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073-83 (Wash. 1987), cert. den. 486 U.S. 1022 
(1996) (rejecting takings claim where construction permit denied under public trust doctrine).  
270 See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (in pre-Lucas decision, rejecting 
takings challenge to county shoreland zoning ordinance establishing buffer zone along navigable 
lakes and rivers along which the natural character of the land may not be changed without a 
conditional use permit). The Court noted that the challenged ordinance was designed to protect 
navigable waters and public rights from degradation and deterioration, and observed the 
interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment of shorelands to the 
purity of the water and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty. 201 
N.W.2d at 765, 768-69. See also Blumm, supra note, at 344-46 (discussing the natural use 
doctrine of Just and its progeny).  
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In a Penn Central analysis, courts first consider the economic impact of 
the challenged regulation.271 In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court accepted 
a case where the state supreme court had previously found that the challenged 
regulation rendered the subject property valueless.272 Subsequent courts, 
however, have demonstrated a less skeptical view of the worth of natural lands, 
perhaps reflecting the evolution of scientific knowledge on the value of wetlands 
and other aquatic resources.273 Moreover, even where wetland regulation has 
deprived property of all value, the landowner may be required to demonstrate a 
reasonable expectation that development would be allowed under the existing 
regulatory climate.274 
 
Under the second Penn Central factor, courts consider the landowners 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.275 Wetland regulators have survived 
takings liability in numerous cases due to the longstanding and comprehensive 
regulation of wetlands under state and federal law. Some courts have invoked the 
so-called notice rule,276 finding that landowner expectations of wetland 
development cannot be reasonable for properties acquired after the effective date 
of the federal Clean Water Act of 1972.277 Other courts date the federal regulatory 
presence back to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, rendering vulnerable 
                                                
271 Cite. 
272 See supra note. 
273 See, e.g., Burgess, supra note. The court was influenced, in part, by the facts that the 
extensive, remote wetlands adjacent to appellee's property have remained undeveloped as has [the 
claimants] property, and that the claimant had made recreational use of his undeveloped property 
for decades without the sought amenities. Id. at 543-44. See also Gove, supra note 258, 831 N.E. 
2d at 872-73 (finding undeveloped coastal property to be worth at least $23,000). 
274 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment in favor of federal defendant in takings challenge to denial of § 404 permit, and 
asserting that the Lucas Court did not hold that the denial of all economically beneficial or 
product use of land eliminates the requirement that the landowner have reasonable, investment-
backed expectations of developing his land). 
275 Cite. 
276 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the 
purchase of lands subject to an existing regulatory scheme serves as an automatic bar to 
compensation. Five Justices agreed to invalidate the so-called notice rule, under which a purchaser 
or successive title holder of an earlier-enacted restriction is barred from asserting a regulatory 
takings claim. See 533 U.S. at 626-27 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, OConnor, Scalia, and 
Thomas, J.J.). Two Justices would find that the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant 
acquires the property helps to shape the reasonableness of the claimants investment-backed 
expectations under a Penn Central analysis. See 533 U.S. at 632-36 (OConnor, concurring) and 
533 U.S. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
277 See, e.g., Norman, supra note; Brace, supra note; Good, supra note (granting governments 
motion for summary judgment on basis that landowner lacked expectations); Forest, supra note. 
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development expectations for regulated lands purchased any time after that 
date.278 Development expectations are also more likely to fail the reasonableness 
test when held by sophisticated or commercial landowners who may be held to a 
higher standard of subjective awareness of the relevant regulatory restrictions on 
wetland development.279 
 
Finally, courts consider the character of the government action under Penn 
Central.280 Whereas some courts have viewed the existence of a pervasive 
regulatory scheme as evidence that development expectations are unreasonable,281 
other courts have considered such regulations as evidence that the government 
action is of an acceptable character. According to this view, the more pervasive 
the statutory program, the more likely it is to promote an average reciprocity of 
advantage, treating all similarly-situated landowners equally, and spreading the 
burden of regulation across a wider spectrum of property.282 Courts are also more 
likely to find a reciprocity of advantage where surrounding properties are 
similarly restricted.283 Moreover, courts are increasingly willing to uphold 
government actions intended to protect ecosystem services against harmful 
development activities.284 Finally, if governmental actions are demonstrated to 
abate a nuisanceeven outside the context of a total taking under Lucassome 
courts have found this to be a complete defense to liability, without consideration 
of the additional Penn Central factors.285 
 
 
                                                
278 See Walcek, supra note (pre-Palazzolo decision). 
279 See Norman, supra note, at 531 (involving sophisticated investors); K&K, supra note (stating 
that plaintiffs are experienced commercial land developers who clearly had or were on notice of 
the [state] wetland regulations.). 
280 Cite. 
281 See supra notes. 
282 See R&Y, supra note, 34 P.3d at *298 (observing that Anchorages setback restriction was part 
of a city-wide (indeed, nationwide) wetlands preservation scheme which applies broadly to all 
landowners and which benefits both the public generally and the landowners in particular); K&K, 
supra note, 705 N.W. 2d at 531 (opining that wetland regulations, much like traditional zoning 
regulations, [are] comprehensive, universal, and ubiquitous).  
283 See Burgess, supra note; Walcek, supra note; Florida Rock, supra note.  
284 See Palazzolo, supra note; R&Y, supra note; Graham, supra note ; K&K, supra note; Claridge, 
supra note; American Dredging, supra note; Machipongo, supra note. 
285 See also Norman, supra note (discussing background principles); John R, supra note (in 
context of physical taking, finding that nuisance can serve as background principle precluding 
liability); and Machipongo, supra note. See also Blumm, supra note 178, at (discussing Lucas 
unanticipated consequence of spawning a categorical defense to regulatory takings claims). 
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3.  Wetland Protection as Offensive Claim 
 
Because wetlands are critical to flood control, water supply, water quality, and, 
of course, wildlife, their rapid disappearance is setting the stage for what may 
eventually become a significant environmental catastrophe.  
 
Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dept of the Interior (1992)286 
 
Perhaps stimulated by Lucass focus upon the potential link between 
nuisance and wetland development, lower courts have increasingly recognized the 
value of wetlands. Going beyond mere rhetoric, in the wake of Lucas, at least one 
court has found that wetland destruction constitutes an affirmative nuisance. In 
Cook v. Sullivan, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that constructing a 
home on jurisdictional wetlands constituted a private nuisance.287 Most 
noteworthy is the courts remedy, which required the defendants to move the 
offending house and foundation a distance of approximately fifty feet.288 
Although acknowledging the severity of the remedy, the trial courtas affirmed 
by the state supreme courtfound such measures to be justified where the 
defendants deliberately ignored the obvious presence of wetlands and filled them 
without a permit.289 
B.  Sprawl as New Nuisance 
There is a connection . . . between the fact that the urban sprawl we live with 
daily makes no room for sidewalks or bike paths and the fact that we are an 
overweight, heart disease-ridden society. 
 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2002)290 
 
[Urban] sprawl has left some densely populated U.S. regions vulnerable to 
flooding on a similar scale to what the Gulf Coast suffered after Hurricane 
Katrina.291 
                                                
286 Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dept of the Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(describing wetlands as an ecological treasure). See also Allison v. Barberry Homes, Inc., 2000 
WL 1473121, *3 (Mass. Super. 2000) (rejecting ironic claim that creation of wetland constitutes 
a private nuisance, and stating that wetlands are a precious resourcenot a nuisance). 
287 Cook v. Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 2003) (finding private nuisance where defendants 
construction caused standing water to accumulate in and beneath structures on neighboring 
property of plaintiffs). 
288 Id. at 1067-68.  
289 Id. 
290 Richard J. Jackson & Chris Kochtitzky, Creating a Healthy Environment: The Impact of the 
Built Environment on Public Health 11 (2002), available at www.sprawlwatch.org (citing study 
by researchers at the National Center for Environmental Health, Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention). 
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The pattern of sprawling land use typically associated with low density, 
suburban housing has engendered both detractors and supporters. Although the 
negative impacts of sprawl have received considerable study, many suburban 
developers and residents vigorously support the right to sprawl,292 citing to the 
privacy, convenience, and safety they believe the suburban landscape provides.293 
In appropriate cases, new nuisance theory might be a tool capable of balancing 
such perceived benefits and detriments, ensuring that a fair share of the negative 
costs of sprawl are borne by those who generate them. A growing body of 
literature has documented the adverse, nuisance-like impacts of sprawl.  
 
1.  The New Learning on Sprawl 
 
a. Economic impacts: Perhaps the best-studied impacts of sprawl are 
those of an economic nature. Low-density development increases the per-capita 
cost of infrastructure such as roads, sewer lines, and water lines.294 In addition, 
the isolation of residential land uses from areas zoned for shopping, employment, 
and service centers causes increased dependence upon the automobile, which in 
turn causes increased air pollution, traffic congestion, and gasoline consumption. 
Providing a classic illustration of externalities, these costs may be reflected in the 
taxes of the entire region, whereas the benefits of sprawl may be enjoyed 
primarily by suburban residents.295 For example, a Rutgers University study found 
                                                                                                                                
291 Scientists: California, St. Louis Risk Katrina-Level Floods, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2006, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2006-02-19-flooding_x.htm?POE=click-refer 
(citing Jeffrey Mount, University of California, for proposition that [urban] sprawl has left some 
densely populated U.S. regions vulnerable to flooding on a similar scale to what the Gulf Coast 
suffered after Hurricane Katrina) 
292 Lester Graham, The Right to Sprawl, May 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.glrc.org/transcript.php3?story_id=1888.  
293 See Bill Bishop, Urban Sprawl Makes Comeback, LEXINGTON-HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 14, 
1999, at F1 (Sprawl doesnt hurt anybody. . . . [It] is the American dream.), cited in Timothy J. 
Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 UNIV. 
PENN. L. REV. 873, 874 n.4 (2000). 
294 See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS I23-24 (1999) (citing study by Urban Land Institute), cited in 
Dowling, Reflections, supra, at 875 n.16. The cost of sprawl has also been studied at the state-
wide level. See, e.g., Maine State Planning Office, The Cost of Sprawl 10 (1997), available at 
http://www.state.me.us/spo/files/spraw (finding that expenditures for education, roads, and police 
by Maine state and local governments increased in real dollars . . . during the 1980s [by] a total of 
over $1300 per Maine household and concluding that [i]t is beyond dispute that the spreading 
out of Maine families is a major contributing factor to the overall increase), cited in Dowling, 
supra at 876 n.17 
295 See, e.g., Lester Graham, Hidden Costs of Sprawl, GREAT LAKES RADIO CONSORTIUM, June 24, 
2002, available at www.glrc.org/transcripts/2002/06/24/graham.htm; MYRON ORFIELD, 
AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY (2002). 
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that prohibiting sprawl would have an economic impact of $357 million upon a 
limited number of landowner/developers over twenty years, whereas permitting 
sprawl would cost state residents $8 billion for otherwise unnecessary 
infrastructure.296 
 
b. Environmental impacts: Sprawling development exacerbates a variety 
of environmental problems. It increases air pollution by increasing automobile 
dependence, which in turn generates additional pollution in the operation of cars 
and in the production of gasoline to fuel them. In addition, low-density 
development increases the consumption of wildlife habitat, agricultural lands, and 
water, as such areas may give way to suburban lawns, described by one researcher 
as the largest irrigated crop in the U.S.297 Sprawl also increases water pollution, 
either through the application of nitrogen-rich fertilizers to large suburban lawns 
or through the use of septic tanks as an inexpensive alternative to municipal sewer 
lines.298 Furthermore, the conversion of forests and farmland to suburban 
development has been linked to climate change and global warming.299 
 
c. Human health and safety impacts: The association between air 
pollution, respiratory illness, and sprawl has long been studied. More recently, 
researchers have begun to explore the link between urban design and an expanded 
range of health impacts, including heart disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, and 
depression.300 The sprawl-obesity link has received particular attention.301 An 
                                                
296 See Robert W. Burchell et al., Impact Assessment of the New Jersey Interim State Development 
and Redevelopment Plan (Rutgers Univ., Ctr. for Poly Research, 1992), cited in Henry R. 
Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies are Losing, 34 CONN. L. REV. 539, 577-78 
(2001). 
297 See Elizabeth Weise, As Suburbs Grow, So do Environmental Fears, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 
2005 (quoting Jennifer Jenkins, professor of environmental economics at the University of 
Vermont). 
298 Id. (citing December 2005 report by the American Geophysical Union, an international 
association of scientists). 
299 See Amy Meersman, NCAR Study: Land Use Affects Climate, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder), Dec. 
9, 2005 (citing study by the National Center for Atmospheric Research indicating that 
deforestation will add at least two degrees Celsius to Amazon surface temperatures by the year 
2100); National Resources Conservation Service, U.S. Dept of Agric., 1997 National Resources 
Inventory Highlights 1 (1999) (documenting doubling of national rate of development from 1982-
1992 to 1992-1997, and noting development of six million acres of U.S. forest, farmland, and 
private open space from 1992-97). In contrast, the expansion of agricultural lands can counteract 
global warming by as much as 50% across various portions of North America, Europe, and Asia. 
Meersman, supra. 
300 From 1960-97, vehicle miles traveled in the United States increased by more than 250%. 
Jackson & Kochtitzky, supra, at 6, citing U.S. Dept of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, Journey-to-Work Trends in the United States and its Major Metropolitan Areas, 1960-
1990, available at http://ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/473.html. The average annual driving time of 
American drivers is 443 hours, the equivalent of 11 work weeks. Jackson & Kochtizky, supra, at 
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emerging subset of the sprawl literature studies the phenomenon of school 
sprawlthe siting of sprawling, single-story, modern schools at the edge of 
town or in areas lacking sidewalks and bicycle paths.302 Increasingly, children are 
unable to walk to school, which in turn increases the occurrence of inactivity-
related ailments.303 With respect to public safety, some scientists have suggested 
that sprawling population patterns may increase the danger of flood-related harm. 
They believe that [u]rban sprawl has left some densely populated U.S. regions 
vulnerable to flooding on a similar scale to what the Gulf Coast suffered after 
Hurricane Katrina, including the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta of California 
and a fourteen thousand acre zone in the Mississippi River floodplain of St. 
Louis.304 One researcher has asked, If we knew about [Hurricane] Katrina 200 
years ago, would we have done the same thing again in New Orleans? . . . Well, in 
California we are reinventing our own Katrina as we speak.305 
 
d. Social and intangible impacts: Some studies indicate that 
deconcentrated land patterns contribute to abandonment of urban communities, 
undercuts economic productivity, denies equal opportunity, destabilizes older 
suburbs, undercuts education investments, reduces public safety, and worsens 
traffic congestion.306 Other work suggests that sprawl may contribute to the 
                                                                                                                                
6, citing CARL POPE, SOLVING SPRAWL (Sierra Club 1999), available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report99/index.asp. 
301 Among American adults, 64.5% are overweight and 30.5% are obese, leading to more than 
300,000 premature deaths annually. Such weight-related deaths are the second leading cause of 
preventable death, following tobacco-related deaths. Reid Ewing et al., Relationship Between 
Urban Sprawl and Physical Activity, Obesity, and Morbidity, 18 AMERICAN J. OF HEALTH 
PROMOTION 47, 54 (September/October 2003) (peer-reviewed study) (citing various studies 
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association). See also Russ Lopez, Urban 
Sprawl and Risk for Being Overweight or Obese, 94 AMERICAN J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1574 
(2004); Arlin Wassereman, Gaining Weight: Michigan Sprawl Increases Waistlines, Health Care 
Costs, MICH. LAND USE INSTITUTE, Mar. 31, 2003; SMART GROWTH AMERICA & SURFACE 
TRANSPORTATION POLICY PROJECT, MEASURING THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF SPRAWL (2003) 
(finding that [r]esidents of sprawling counties were likely to walk less during leisure time, weigh 
more, and have a greater prevalence of hypertension than residents of compact counties). 
302 See generally David Goldberg, Sprawl vs. Small: When Can Johnny Walk to School Again, 
MICHIGAN LAND USE INSTITUTE, Sept. 16, 2005, available at 
http://mlui.org/print.asp?fileid=16920. 
303 Between 1969 and 2001, the percentage of students who commuted to school by foot or bicycle 
decline from approximately 50% to 10%, while childhood obesity rose to 30%. Id. In one county 
study, 57% of school principals rated the area around their schools as moderately to extremely 
dangerous for kids on foot or bicycle. Id. (citing study by Dekalb County Health Department). 
304 Scientists: California, St. Louis Risk Katrina-Level Floods, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2006-02-19-flooding_x.htm?POE=click-refer.  
305 Id. (quoting presentation of Jeffrey Mount, University of California, at annual conference of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science). 
306 See  Richmond, supra note 296, at 20.  
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economic and racial segregation of residential neighborhoods. As early as 1968, 
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recognized a connection 
between land use patterns and racial segregation.307 Anecdotal subjective 
evidence suggests that, for some, sprawl may lead to a decline in community 
welfare and individual happiness.308 These subjective claims are bolstered by 
objective data indicating that sprawl-induced traffic congestion may cost 
Americans seventy-two billion dollars annually in lost time and fuel309 and over 
two hundred lives annually that are lost to road rage.310 Popular support for anti-
sprawl measures also suggests widespread dissatisfaction with sprawling 
development.311  
 
2.  Defending Sprawl Regulations 
 
Among the measures taken by local governments today to curb sprawl, 
zoning regulations are perhaps the most common. For example, in response to the 
trend toward the supersizing of houses, some municipalities have amended their 
zoning ordinances to set maximum limits on square footage or lot coverage.312 
                                                
307 The report suggested, 
Most new employment opportunities . . . are being created in suburbs and 
outlying areasand this trend is likely to continue indefinitely. . . . [The 
exclusion of blacks from this emerging suburban work force would become] the 
single most important source of poverty among Negroes [and a principle source 
of family and social disorganization.] 
 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Bantam Books 1968), 
cited in Richmond, supra, at n.127. 
308 See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, USA TODAY, June 4, 2002, at A12 (claiming, that [u]nchecked 
sprawl has worsened environmental conditions, has bred a wasteland of mega-marts and malls 
and, frankly, has diminished the quality of life); Dowling, supra note, at 874 n.18 (concluding 
that unchecked sprawl has shifted from an engine of Californias growth to a force that now 
threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of our life) (citing study sponsored by the 
Bank of America, California Resources Agency, Greenbelt Alliance, and the Low Income Fund); 
David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 
3343 (2004). 
309 Dowling, supra note 293, at 875 (citing to report by Texas Transportation Institute) (finding 
that Washington, D.C. residents waste about seventy-six hours each year in traffic jams at a cost 
of about $1260 per person.). 
310 Dowling, supra (citing to 1996 data reported by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety). 
311 Dowling, supra, at 877 and n.24 (noting that voters in 1998 approved over 70% of the 240 
sprawl-control ballot initiatives, and reporting comments in support of smart growth and open 
space protection by 34 governors in 1998 inaugural remarks or state of the state speeches). 
312 See Tom Kenworthy, Oversize Homes Wear Out Welcome, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006 
(describing Aspen, Colorado ban on homes exceeding 15,000 square feet, and Arlington County, 
Virginias limitation of building footprint to 30% of lot). 
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Zoning has also been used as a weapon against the proliferation of big box 
stores, with their perceived ability to sap traditional downtowns of their economic 
vitality.313 The legitimacy of zoning is well established, and challenges to sprawl-
preventing restrictions have been largely unsuccessful.314 
 
As early as 1926, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of local 
communities to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances.315 Ironically, traditional 
zoning fostered the very type of low-density, use-separating, sprawling 
development that modern regulations seek to prevent. For example, in Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, the 1974 Court upheld in poetic terms the governments 
discretion to promote the kind of development that some today might criticize as 
sprawl: 
 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor 
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project 
addressed to family needs. . . . The police power is not confined to 
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay 
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of 
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. . 
. .316 
 
Later, zoning ordinances would be used by some communities to limit undesirable 
sprawling development. Almost thirty years ago, the Court specifically endorsed 
sprawl prevention as a valid objective of zoning. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the 
Court upheld the authority of government to address air, noise and water 
pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the 
ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other 
demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl.317 
                                                
313 See Symposium 2005: The Big Box Challenge, 6 VERMONT J. ENVTL L. (2004-2005). 
314 See generally, Dowling, supra 293, at 884 (2000); Lora A. Lucero & Harrison T. Higgins, 
Citizens Taking Matters into Their Own Hands, 37 URB. LAW. 607 (2005); Chris J. Williams, Do 
Smart Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges? A Survey of Smart Growth and 
Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L. REV. 895 (2004); Robert H. 
Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings 
Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589 (2002); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth 
and Limits on Government Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life under the 
Takings and Other Provisions, DICK J. ENVTL L. & POLY 421 (2001); William W. Buzbee, 
Sprawls Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 
(2000). But see Richmond, supra note 296. 
315 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding local zoning 
ordinance as valid exercise of authority and rejecting facial attack). 
316 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding villages goals as permissible 
exercise of police power). 
317 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (asserting that it has long . . . been 
recognized as legitimate [for local governments to regulate] the premature and unnecessary 
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Following the lead of the Supreme Court, many lower courts have upheld 
sprawl-control measures against challenges brought under the fifth amendment 
and under a variety of other constitutional theories. In cases where the 
government has prevailed, courts generally emphasize the nuisance-like aspects of 
sprawl, concluding that the government has ample authority for its prevention. In 
cases decided before Lingle,318 this type of analysis is particularly pronounced, 
with some courts conflating the issues of whether a particular ordinance is a valid 
exercise of governmental authority, and whether the exercise of such authority 
constitutes a regulatory taking.319 After Lingle, courts have continued to support 
the validity of sprawl control measures.320 In a closely-watched California case, 
for example, the City of Turlock adopted a zoning ordinance clearly aimed at 
preventing the development of a Wal-Mart store.321 In rejecting Wal-Marts 
challenge to the ordinance, the court noted with approval the legislative purposes 
of protect[ing] against urban/suburban decay, increased traffic, and reduced air 
quality, all of which, according to the City, can result from the development of 
discount superstores.322 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
conversion of open-space land to urban uses), disapproved on other grounds, First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See also Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. TRPA, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (holding that moratorium on 
development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan does not 
constitute a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the 
United States Constitution). 
318 See supra Part II.D. 
319 See, e.g., Windward Marina v. City of Destin, 743 So.2d 635, 639-40 (Fla. App. 1999) 
(rejecting takings challenge to denial of permit to construct dry-dock marina, and evaluating 
resultant increased boat traffic in context of nuisance law); Loretto Development Co., Inc. v. 
Village of Chardon, 149 F.3d 1183 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting takings 
challenge to denial of landowners proposal to re-zone property to permit construction of Wal-
Mart store); Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
takings challenge to zoning ordinance preventing landowners from building home in forest use 
zone, and citing with approval governmental interest in protecting commercial timber practices 
against the adverse consequences of sprawl).  
320 See, e.g., Peste v. Mason County, 136 P.3d 140, 144, 150 (Wash. App. 2006) (rejecting takings 
challenge to denial of rezoning petition to allow increased residential density, and noting with 
approval countys goal of reducing sprawl). 
321 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 138 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2006) (rejecting police 
power and state law challenge to zoning ordinance). The challenged zoning provision would limit 
the ability of big box retailers to sell nontaxable items such as groceries. Id. at 280. 
322 Id. at 281, 301. See also In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997) (upholding 
Vermonts Act 250). 
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3.   Sprawl Protection as Offensive Claim 
 
A public way is obstructed just as effectively by a pattern of low-density 
development that over time generates more auto trips than roads can handle, as 
by an ox cart abandoned in the middle of a road.323 
 
Sprawl presents a more tenuous case for nuisance than does wetland 
destruction. Unlike the latterwhich may even support an affirmative action for 
nuisance abatementin the case of sprawl it may be difficult to trace causation 
and to prove sufficient injury for standing. As one commentator has noted, 
[traditional] nuisances hurtled directly and immediately across property lines and 
substantially harmed a clearly identifiable, usually adjacent, rural landowner and 
perhaps a few others.324 In contrast, this commentator notes, a subdivision or 
shopping mall at the metropolitan fringe affects people in the interior from a 
considerable distance, in an indirect manner . . . and affects many people a little 
instead of one or a few people a great deal.325 Even if these problems of injury 
and causation can be overcome, the very pervasiveness and success of land use 
regulations such as zoning poses hurdles to the affirmative nuisance suit. 
Otherwise viable common law actions may be preempted by complementary 
legislative efforts to curb sprawl.326 
C. Global Warming as New Nuisance 
 
1.  The New Learning on Global Warming 
 
  As the composition of the earths atmosphere changes, more of the suns 
energy is trapped rather than radiated back into space.327 This change is brought 
about by the emission of so-called greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, 
nitrous oxide, methane, hydroflourocarbons, sulphur hexafluouride, and 
perfluorochloride.328 About seventy-five percent of the carbon dioxide emitted by 
                                                
323 Richmond, supra note 296, at 577-78 (2001) (arguing that [p]ublic health is threatened just as 
much by airborne emissions from millions of tailpipes as by the airborne germs from rotting hog 
carcasses or a malarial pond). 
324 Id. 577-78 (2001).  
325 Id. 
326 Id. (arguing that the apparently slam-dunk nuisance lawsuit is not viable because state 
legislatures have supplanted common-law nuisance principles with sprawl zoning. The argument 
would have to be that because 1920s style zoning does not attempt to assess the metro-wide 
impacts of many modern land uses, zoning statutes do not pre-empt nuisance claims). 
327 See generally, Environmental Protection Agency, Global Warming, available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf. 
328 The first three greenhouse gases occur both naturally and as byproducts of human activities, 
whereas the remaining three gases are not naturally occurring. Id. at Global WarmingEmissions. 
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humans during the past two decades can be attributed to the burning of fossil fuels 
(primarily by automobiles and power plants), with additional emissions 
attributable to deforestation and other land use changes.329  
 
Perhaps the best scientific consensus on climate change (including global 
warming) is provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United 
Nations Environment Programme.330 The IPCC has issued a series of assessment 
reports, the most recent of which was released in summary form in February 
2007.331 
 
Although the human causes of global warming are subject to a measure of 
dispute, they have been identified with an increasing degree of confidence over 
time. In 2001, the IPCC asserted that although natural factors have made small 
contributions to global warming, concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse 
gases and their radiative forcing have continued to increase as a result of human 
activities.332 In response, in 2001 the United States agreed that the increase in 
surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures over the past several 
decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but added, we cannot rule 
out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural 
variability.333 The IPCCs subsequent report, Climate Change 2007, concluded, 
[t]he understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate 
has improved since the Third Assessment Report, . . . leading to very high 
confidence that the globally averaged net effect of human activities since 1750 has 
been one of warming. . . .334 The IPCC added that the rate of increase of radiative 
forcing during the industrial era due to increases in carbon dioxide, methane, and 
nitrous oxide . . . is very likely to have been unprecedented in more than 10,000 
years.335  
                                                
329 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis 7 
(2001). 
330 Cite. 
331 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis: Summary for Policymakers (approved February 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/. 
332 Climate Change 2001, supra note 329, at 6-9 (defining radiative forcing as a measure of the 
influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-
atmosphere system, and [as] an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change 
mechanism). See also id. at 10 (asserting, [t]here is new and stronger evidence that most of the 
warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities). 
333 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY 
QUESTIONS 1 (2001). 
334 Climate Change 2007, supra note 331, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
335 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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  The IPCC predicts a variety of climate changes by the end of the twenty-
first century, including an average surface temperature increase of 1.8 to 4.0 
degrees centigrade, and a rise of global mean sea level of 0.18 to 0.59 meters.336 
Moreover, the IPCC finds that increases in tropical cyclone (typhoon and 
hurricane) wind and precipitation intensities are likely.337 
 
2.  Defending Climate Regulations 
 
As discussed in the previous two sections, wetland destruction and land 
use patterns are regulated by well-developed legislative schemes under the Clean 
Water Act and local zoning ordinances, respectively. Those seeking to avoid such 
regulation have claimed, inter alia, that it constitutes a regulatory taking for 
which compensation is requireda claim that may be refuted in some cases by a 
new nuisance defense. Surprisingly, this same pattern has not appeared in the 
context of global warming regulation.338 That is, opponents of the emerging law 
have not challenged it under the fifth amendment regulatory takings doctrine.339 
 
The most obvious explanation for this absence of takings litigation is quite 
simple: there is little or no regulation in existence to serve as the target of a 
challenge, either at the federal or state levels. In fact, at the federal level, it is 
those who support regulationand not property rights advocates opposing it
who have filed suit. For example, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency340 the issue is whether the states and others can compel the federal 
                                                
336 Id. at 11 (predicting changes at years 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999).  
337 Id. at 7, 12. See also P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and 
Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844 (Sept. 16, 2005) (concluding that global 
data indicate a 30-year trend toward more frequent and intense hurricanes, and that [t]his trend is 
not inconsistent with recent climate model simulations that a doubling of CO2 may increase the 
frequency of the most intense cyclones, although attribution of the 30-year trends to global 
warming would require a longer global data record and, especially, a deeper understanding of the 
role of hurricanes in the general circulation of the atmosphere and ocean).  
338 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
339 For a summary of the global warming lawsuits pending as of February 5, 2007, see Justin R. 
Pidot, Global Warming in the Courts (Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute) (Nov. 
2006 & Feb. 5, 2007 Supp.), 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/global_warming_litigation/global (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007). The regulation of air pollutants released into the global commons may 
differ conceptually from the regulation of wetlands filling or other uses of private property. 
Nevertheless, the regulation of air pollution may also serve as the basis for a regulatory taking 
claim. See, e.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692 (Fed. App. 2005) (rejecting 
takings challenge by restaurant and bar owners to city ordinance restricting smoking in enclosed 
public places). 
340 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S.Ct. 2960 (2006). Twelve states and others brought an action challenging the 
Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) denial of a petition under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air 
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government to regulate greenhouse gases, not whether any such regulation would 
run afoul of the takings doctrine.  
 
Thus, it may be simply too soon for takings litigation to have materialized, 
particularly as-applied rather than facial challenges. As an alternative 
explanation, could it be possible that regulatory takings challenges will never pose 
a significant hurdle to global warming legislation? That is, as the science on 
climate change develops, it becomes increasingly apparent that those who pollute 
the atmosphere with greenhouse gases are unleashing nuisance-like harms upon 
society. As a result, the new nuisance doctrine of Lucas may become an 
increasingly powerful affirmative defense to developing regulation. 
  
This hypothesis may be supported by industrys reaction to Californias 
pioneering effort to regulate greenhouse gases at the state level. Many in the 
regulated community do not challenge the conclusion that greenhouse gas 
emissions should be regulated; instead, through preemption claims they raise the 
issue of which authority (federal or state) should oversee the regulation. For 
example, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, automobile 
manufacturers challenged Californias 2004 adoption of vehicle emission 
regulations for greenhouse gases, claiming that the states action had been 
preempted by various federal statutes and that the new emission standards would 
usurp the Federal Transportation Departments authority to regulate fuel 
economy.341 Beyond the vehicle emission legislation of 2004, California also 
enacted groundbreaking state-wide emission caps for stationary as well as mobile 
sources, through the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.342 At least by years 
end, the statute had not been challenged in the courts.343 Instead, some have called 
for similar legislation to be enacted on a nationwide scale.  
                                                                                                                                
Act, seeking the regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles. In holding that the EPA properly exercised its discretion in denying the rulemaking 
petition, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Congress gave the agency considerable discretion under § 
202(a)(1) to utilize not only scientific evidence, but also policy judgments in deciding whether or 
not to regulate specific pollutants. In so concluding, the court cited to a 2001 statement by the 
National Research Council that a causal linkage between greenhouse gas emissions and global 
warming cannot be unequivocally established. The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on 
November 29, 2006, and a decision is expected spring 2007.  
341 2006 WL 2734359 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (denying state defendants motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim). On January 17, 2007, the district court stayed further proceedings pending the 
Supreme Courts decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 
126 S.Ct. 2960 (2006). See 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
342 A.B. 32 (Aug. 30, 2006) (applying emission caps to power plants, oil refineries, cement plants, 
large dairies, and other major industrial sources). 
343 For other preemption litigation see Lincoln Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, No. 1:06CV00070 (D. R.I. 
filed Feb. 13, 2006) (alleging that Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the implied federal 
foreign affairs power preempt state regulation of motor vehicle emissions); Green Mountain 
Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge v. Torti, No. 2:05CV00302 (D. Vt. filed Nov. 18, 2005) (alleging that 
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3.  Climate Protection as Offensive Claim 
 
Climate protection advocates have filed a series of lawsuits challenging 
atmospheric pollution as nuisance. Although plaintiffs face numerous procedural 
and substantive hurdles, they are edging closer to at least establishing standing 
to pursue such actions.344 Although the likelihood of success is still small, the 
stakes are enormous. As one practitioner notes, The prospect of liability is a 
serious matter. . . . Even if the risk appears to be small in terms of the likelihood 
of being found liable, the consequences of being held liable are substantial
potentially in the trillions of dollars.345  
 
Three cases are noteworthy. First, because the appellants in Massachusetts 
v. EPA had been unsuccessful before the D.C. Circuit in forcing the EPA to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions,346 they brought an offensive nuisance claim as 
an alternative avenue of relief. In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 
many of the same states and environmental organizations again sought to abate 
global warming, this time terming it a public nuisance.347 Plaintiffs targeted five 
public utility companies as defendants, alleging that they emit one fourth of the 
carbon dioxide in the United States, and therefore contribute significantly to 
climate change.348 Plaintiffs sought a complicated remedy, asking the court to set 
a cap on each defendants emission of carbon dioxide, as well as set an emission 
                                                                                                                                
Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the implied federal foreign affairs power preempt state 
regulation of motor vehicle emissions). 
344 Kristin Choo, Feeling the Heat: The Growing Debate Over Climate Change Takes on Legal 
Overtones, ABA J. 29, 34 (July 2006) (quoting J. Kevin Healy, environmental lawyer in Bryan 
Caves New York City office). 
345 Id. (quoting John C. Dernbach, co-chair, Sustainable Development, Ecosystems and Climate 
Change Committee, ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources). Dernbachs 
observations are reminiscent of Judge Learned Hands articulation of the so-called Carroll 
Towing Formula, under which a defendants duty in tort is a function of three variables: the 
probability of harm, the gravity of harm, and the burden of adequate precautions. United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (holding barge company liable in 
negligence for damage occurring when barge broke away from its mooring during daylight hours 
when no attendant was aboard the ship). Extrapolating broadly to the context of global warming, 
the greater the body of evidence that catastrophic climate change is likely to occur, the more 
reasonable it becomes to impose liability upon atmospheric polluters. 
346 Massachusetts v. EPA, supra notes and accompanying text. 
347 Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F.Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing 
action as non-justiciable political question), appeal pending, Case No. 05-5104-CV (2nd Cir.). See 
generally, Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 
293 (2005) (doubting success of claim). 
348 Connecticut v. AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d at. 
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reduction schedule.349 The court granted defendants motion to dismiss on the 
ground that climate change as a public nuisance is a non-justiciable political 
question.350 Nevertheless, the court provided instructive language suggesting 
weaknesses that future environmental plaintiffs might overcome to prosecute 
successful nuisance actionsindicating that the relief sought was overbroad, 
revealing the transcendently legislative nature of [the] litigation.351  
 
Two additional cases are more promising for an ultimate recognition of 
climate change as public nuisance, ruling in favor of environmental plaintiffs on 
the standing-related issues of injury-in-fact, causation and redressability. In 
Friends of the Earth v. Watson,352 plaintiffs/environmental organizations alleged 
that defendants353 had provided assistance to particular projects that contribute to 
climate change without complying with the National Environmental Policy Act 
and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court found that plaintiffs had 
standing, noting that a more lenient standard should be applied in cases alleging 
procedural statutory violations.354 Similarly, Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center v. Owens Corning Corporation held that environmental plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge alleged violations of the Clean Air Act that could promote 
                                                
349 Id.. This request would have required defendants to comply with emissions caps that parallel 
the Kyoto Protocol, which was not ratified by the United States. Id. 
350 Id.  
351 Id. at 265 (describing prayer for court to enjoin[] each of the defendants to abate its 
contribution to the nuisance by capping its emissions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those 
emissions by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade). See also In Re: Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation, 2006 WL 1980639, *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 23, 2006) (denying defendant gasoline producers motion to dismiss on basis of political 
question doctrine, and distinguishing Connecticut v. AEP as a case in which plaintiffs sought 
quasi-legislative relief when Congress and the Executive had specifically refused to act); 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp., 2006 WL 1594130 at *11 (D. 
Or. June 8, 2006) (distinguishing Connecticut v. AEP as a case where the court was asked to 
make a free-wheeling policy choice and decide whether global warming is, or is not, a serious 
threat or what measures should be taken to remedy that problem). 
352 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (denying 
defendants motion for summary judgment). 
353 Defendants are Peter Watson, Chief Executive Officer of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC), and Peter Merrill, Vice Chairman and First Vice President of the Export-
Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im). As the court explained, OPIC, an independent 
government corporation, offers insurance and loan guarantees for projects in developing countries. 
. . . Ex-Im, an independent governmental agency and wholly-owned government corporation, 
provides financing support for exports from the United States. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2197(a)). 
354 See id. at *2 (When, as here, a plaintiff seeks to challenge a procedural violation, some 
uncertainty about redressability and causality is allowed.); see also id. at *3 (Here, any concern 
that Plaintiffs asserted injuries are caused by third parties must be evaluated in light of lower 
threshold for causation in procedural injury cases.). 
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global warming.355 The court found that plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated 
causation, even though they relied upon indirect links between cause and effect.356 
In declining to adopt a narrow view of standing, the court rejected the notion
derived from the special injury rule of public nuisancethat injury to all is 
injury to none.357 Under that view, the court explained, if the proposed action 
threatened the very survival of our species, no person would have standing to 
contest it. The greater the threatened harm, the less power the courts would have 
to intercede. That is an illogical proposition.358 
 
4.  New Learning on Global Warming as Legislative Catalyst  
  
When the potential threat of climate change first came to the national 
attention, many in government and industry responded with denial. International 
efforts to draft and ratify the Kyoto Protocol highlight this opposition in the 
United States to aggressive regulation. The Clinton administration ultimately 
agreed through the Kyoto Protocol to reduce U.S. emissions seven percent below 
1990 levels, to be achieved by 2012.359 During its negotiations, however, the 
administration introduced several stumbling blocks that would continue to be 
hallmarks of U.S. policy through successive administrations. These hurdles 
                                                
355 Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F.Supp. 2d 957 (D.Or. 
June 8, 2006) (upholding standing in action alleging violations of Clean Air Act § 165(a)). 
356 The court noted, 
Other forecasted impacts from [defendants] emissions would operate less 
directly. For instance, ozone-depleting emissions from Defendants facility must 
first ascend to the stratosphere before impacting persons on the ground in 
Oregon. Global warming likewise operates indirectly. Higher sea levels in 
Oregon will supposedly result from melting ice in the earths polar regions. . . . 
Nevertheless, the adverse effects alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint would be felt 
by them here in Oregon, and the source of Defendants emissions would be in 
Oregon. 
Id. at *6, *8 (recognizing more lenient requirement of causation in context of motion to dismiss 
for lack of standing than in context of merits of tort action). 
357 Id. at *6. 
358 Id. See also California v. General Motors Corp., No. 3:06CV05755 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20, 
2006) (asserting nuisance claim against manufacturer of motor vehicles); Comer v. Murphy Oil, 
2006 WL 1474089 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 19, 2006) (asserting third amended complaint in nuisance 
against oil and gas companies, claiming that their greenhouse gas emissions exacerbated the 
damage caused by Hurricane Katrina). 
359 DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 35 (2002). The author had been a former liaison of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency to the United Nations from 1995 to 1998, a member of several 
U.S. delegations to UN negotiations on environmental and development issues, and a long-time 
observer of the U.S. role in international environmental issues. . . . Id. at xv. 
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included policy options to reduce the economic impact of compliance, as well as 
demanding that all nations (both developed and developing) agree to the 
Protocol.360 The George W. Bush administration rejected the treaty, citing to 
scientific uncertainty, as well as to the factors mentioned by the Clinton 
administration.361 For its part, the Senate refused to ratify the Protocol.362 A 
prominent senator stated, for example, [a]ny way you measure this, this is a bad 
deal for America.363 Similarly, another senator would later denounce the threat 
of catastrophic global warming as the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the 
American people.364 Industry, too, mounted an attack on the Protocol, airing 
commercials that showed a scissors cutting those countries out of a world map 
that would not have enforceable emissions targets . . . [thereby suggesting] that a 
Kyoto treaty would unfairly exempt these nations.365 Several years later industry 
would engage in another memorable television advertising campaign, this time in 
response to the movie, An Inconvenient Truth.366 Showing an attractive, pigtailed 
young girl blowing onto a dandelion stalk to scatter its seeds, the narrator states, 
[carbon dioxide] is essential to life [because] we breathe it out. The narrator 
concludes, referring to carbon dioxide, They call it pollution. We call it life.367 
 
Over time, there has been a reversal of attitudes among political and 
industrial leaders about the seriousness of the threat posed by global warming. In 
response, some have called for governmental measures to encourage voluntary 
efforts to protect the global atmosphere. For example, in 2005 Senator Chuck 
Hagela staunch opponent of the Kyoto Protocolintroduced three legislative 
bills to spur the development of clean-energy technologies.368 He stopped well 
                                                
360 Id. at 30-31. 
361 Id. at 40-41. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. at 37 (quoting Senator Chuck Hagel, R-Neb). 
364 Senator James M. Inhofe (R-Okla), Climate Change Update: Senate Floor Statement (Jan. 4, 
2005) (quoting from Senate floor statement of July 28, 2003), 
http://Inhofe.senate.gov/pressreleases/climateupdate.htm (visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
365 BROWN, supra note 359, at 33 (describing an industry coalition of oil companies, electric 
utilities, automobile manufacturers, and farm groups . . . [that] launched a multi-million-dollar 
advertising campaign to generate public opposition to a Kyoto treaty). 
366 See Competitive Enterprise Institute, We Call It Life (showing clip of Energy, a 60-second 
television spot[] [to be aired from May 18 to May 28, 2006] focusing on the alleged global 
warming crisis and the calls by some environmental groups and politicians for reduced energy 
use), http://streams.cei.org/ (visited May 25, 2006). 
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368 See Amanda Griscom Little, The Chuck Stops Here: An Interview with Senator Chuck Hagel, 
Republican from Nebraska, on His New Climate Bills, GRIST, Mar. 2005, 
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short of endorsing mandatory emission caps, however, relying instead upon 
voluntary public-private partnerships and upon incentives to industry.369 
Similarly, commenting on the release of Climate Change 2007,370 the Bush 
administration embraced the report, but indicated that it would continue to rely 
primarily upon voluntary methods to address the problem.371 Also promoting 
voluntary efforts, Wal-Mart launched a broad sustainability campaign in 2006. 
Among other things, the effort seeks to double the efficiency of its vehicle fleet in 
ten years, and to reduce the energy use in its stores by thirty percent.372  
 
Some have gone even farther, seeking mandatory regulation of 
atmospheric pollution contributing to climate change. For example, some 
politicians have called for the prompt enactment of mandatory caps on U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions.373 Increasingly, industry has supported such calls. In a 
move that would have been largely unthinkable just a decade ago, a coalition of 
prominent businesses and environmental groupsthe United States Climate 
Action Partnershiphas recently called on the federal government to quickly 
enact strong national legislation to require significant reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions.374 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/03/01/hagel/ (visited Feb. 11, 2007). With respect to his 
position on climate change treaties, the Senator asserted,  
My position has been very consistent. In 1997, I introduced the Byrd-Hagel 
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any climate-change treaty that does not include developing nations and does 
harm to the U.S. economy. So Im right where I was in 1997, and thats 
reflected in the legislation that I introduced. Ive always said that climate change 
is a cycle of the world. Weve always had extreme swings in climate, long 
before there was a combustion engine or a great population of human beings in 
the world. 
Id.  
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Undoubtedly, a constellation of factors has prompted this growing 
acceptance of mandatory legislation. Foremost among them, perhaps, is the new 
scientific learning about the threats and causes of climate changeembodied in 
prominent reports such as Climate Change 2001 and Climate Change 2007.375 As 
the knowledge base increases, societys reaction may change from that of 
environmental cynicism to that of environmental connectivity.376 As a result, 
the new nuisance has evolved in the context of global warming. Through 
offensive nuisance law suits, courts have increasingly been asked to expand the 
conventional wisdom on cause and effect.377 As an attorney from one prominent 
law firm has surmised, successful common law nuisance suits can spur 
legislative action. . . . Todays global warming nuisance suits could have the 
effect of encouraging Congress to adopt more comprehensive legislative solutions 
a few years from now.378  
CONCLUSION: TOWARD THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION? 
 
Lucas purported to establish a new bright-line threshold of takings 
liability, triggered when regulation deprives landowners of all economically 
beneficial use.379 Ironically, however, the new nuisance defense has proved to 
be more enduring than the rule. As one commentator stated, what Justice Scalia 
hoped to serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to work 
more often as a per se no takings rule.380 As a result of the new rule and defense 
of Lucas, courts have placed a renewed emphasis upon a broad balancing of 
public and private interests. Drawing upon the long tradition of nuisance law, 
courts weigh factors as concrete as market value and as ephemeral as 
happiness.381 As an opinion from the D.C. Circuit stated, courts have returned to a 
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law adopted in the 1970s was enacted in response to rulings in common law suits brought to 
redress environmental injuries). 
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gestalt approach that evaluates both the purpose and desired effect of 
governmental regulation.382 
 
Perhaps the broader lesson from Lucas and its progeny is that the public 
interestand its supporting regulationscannot be circumscribed by a single 
measure as narrow as the economic impact of regulation upon landowners. 
Rather, as recognized long ago by Penn Central, economic impact is but one 
factor that societies should consider in a just and equitable distribution of the 
burdens of modern life.383 Courts should identify all of the impacts of an action
in accordance with changed circumstances and new learningin determining 
whether such action may be regulated without compensation in the name of the 
public interest. In this context, the reincorporation of nuisance into the law of 
regulatory takings levels the playing field between public and private interests. By 
examining cause-effect relationships, nuisance is capable of defusing the modern 
one-sided rhetoric of rights that portrays landowners as the victims of government 
regulators, even when those landowners generate negative externalities that spill 
over into neighboring communities. 
 
The legacy of Lucas may go far beyond the context of regulatory takings 
in particular, and litigation in general. Instead, innovators are beginning to see 
more potential profit in fighting global warming than in fighting the governments 
increasingly-likely regulation of global warming. The first and second industrial 
revolutions brought new technologies to England and the United States, 
respectively,384including the spinning Jenny, the water frame, the steam 
engine, and the locomotive.385 Some claim that a third industrial revolution may 
now be underway, fueled by the development of technological solutions to 
increasingly prominent environmental challenges such as providing sustainable 
energy and addressing global warming.386 Banking on this entrepreneurial spirit, 
British billionaire Richard Branson and former vice president Al Gore announced 
a contest to remove at least one billion tons of carbon dioxide annually from the 
                                                                                                                                
extreme danger to the life, property and happiness of others); 17 Maine Revised Statutes § 2802 
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atmosphere.387 As a prize, Branson has offered twenty-five million dollars.388 
Looking at the related potential for developing clean, renewable energy sources to 
achieve national energy independence, one analysis by environmental and labor 
organizations predicts that an annual investment of thirty billion dollars for ten 
years would trigger the creation of 3.3 million jobs and a $1.4 million increase in 
the gross domestic product.389 In at least a small measure, perhaps these 
developments can be attributed to Lucass unintentional reinvigoration of 
nuisance law, with its concomitant examination of the actions that threaten critical 
environmental resources. 
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